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PART I

GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

A) differences

between the judicial review in the U.S. and

in Germany

There are many differences

between the german and the U.s.

legal system.
Besides

one of the most obvious differences

- a common law

and case by case system on one and a civil law system with
only written
purpose

law on the other side - the source and the

of the two legal systems differ in a fundamental

and

eminent way: the U.s. law is made "by the people for the
people" whereas

the law in Germany

is made by elected

representatives

to protect the rule of law.

The U.S. legal system is build upon the realization
introduction

of the u.s. constitution:

of the

"We the people ..."

and refers to the will of the people as the main source of
the law.1 The german legal system's main aim is to establish
reliance

in the whole legal system knowing and accepting

see: Winfried Brugger, "Verfassungen im Vergleich",
"Ruperto Carola, Forschungsmagazin
der Universitaet
Heidelberg", 3/1994,22,23
1

1

in:

2

that this may oppose or even harm individuals.2

That of

course does not mean that the german legal system is enacted
only to serve legal principles

but as all of the german

are enacted to serve an abstract
the application

and not an individual

of the law for an individual

be or can be more difficult

because

individual

case,
may

in a civil law system

there is more weight put on the abstract
certain

therefore

laws

principles

than on

problems.

In the U.S. the judges find the law and the judges represent
the people,

sometimes

assisted

by a jury. Though of course

the jurors do not make the law - nobody will deny the great
impact this jury system has on the development

and outcome

of the legal system.
The aim is to make law with "common sense" and with the
peoples will. with that the people have a greater

influence

on how they want the law to be and in what direction
legal system then really moves. Furthermore,
chief of the executive
these

appoints

as the elected

the most important

judges will find the law in a foreseeable

often will represent
law that the majority

this

judges

way and most

and express the ideas about ethics and
thinks is correct.

Eberhard SChmidt-Assmann,
"Oer Rechtsstaat", 987,1030,
in: "Handbuch des Staatsrechts", ed. by J.Isensee/P.Kirchhof

2

3

Beeing a representative
- the only influence
elect the members
candidate

democracy

- Grundgesetz

people in Germany have on the law is to

of Parliament

but the fact that "their"

is elected does not necessarily

their thoughts

that lead to an enactment

a law do obey almost the same democratic
- but nevertheless

in Germany

listening

"fundamental

in both
have

first obey their party's will

in the conventional,

democracy"

u.s.

of

because

to the wishes of their voters.

change

representative

necessities

the people in the

on their representatives

representatives
before

with

lateron will enact.

Of course the legal procedures

more influence

correspond

about the law and it has nothing to do with

the law the Parliament

countries

art 20 (2)3

has occurred

Doing this a

liberal form of
and produced

a new

system, the "party state".4
Because

the law is abstract

be thought
lobbyists

nobody's

special

of except for those interests
with financial

interests

presented

will

by mighty

or other influence.

The judicial branch really is independent

because all judges

have life tenure and can only be removed by impeachment.
More than that not the executive
but there are certain commissions

branch elects the judges
that appoint the judges.

3 Grundgesetz (GG), German Constitution, enacted May 23rd
1949; Beck-Texte im dtv, 31st ed.,February 1st 1994
4 see: Justice Prof. Dr. H. Steinberger, "Political
Representation in Germany", 121,128, in: "Germany and its
Basic Law", ed. by P.Kirchhof/ D.Kommers, (1993)

4

The judges are not appointed
a certain
believes

political

independent

but because

of their legal ability.5

is seen as a 'political'

neutral and

branch that is the one with the knowledge

the independence

to

party or because they have certain

or opinions

The judicial branch

because of their membership

and

to say how the law is to be used and how

the law should be interpreted.
Not "common sense" or "people's
legislators

intention

interpreting

opinions"

but the

and its aim is the main source

the law should there be doubts on how the law

was meant to be.

To balance

the abstract

disadvantages
individual

and objective

way with the

that may occur to the individual

has the constitutionally

guaranteed

to sue before the Federal Constitutional

each
entitlement

Court6,

GG art 93

(1) No 4.
Certain

formal requirements

like standing

have to be fulfilled,

and exhaustion

Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz7

of course,

of remedies,
sects. 90 - 96.

see: D.Clark, "The Selection and Accountability of Judges
in West Germany", 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1795,1818,1829 (1988)

5

Federal Constitutional
Bundesverfassungsgericht

6

Court (F.e.e.) =
(BVerfG), located in Karlsruhe

Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz
(BVerfGG), code with the
procedural rules, requirements and rights of the BVerfG

7

5

There are about 3000 constitutional
and if the formal requirements

are fulfilled

to review the lawsuit. The Justices
have the possibility
important

complaints

each year8

the F.C.C. has

of the F.C.C. do not

to select the cases they think are most

or interesting

those constitutional

but they have to review all of

claims if the formal requirements

are

fulfilled.
Main aim of the F.C.C. is to protect the individual

and

his/her

the main

constitutionally

guaranteed

rights9 whereas

aim of the Supreme Court is to give final decisions
important

questions

and to establish

legal uniformity

cases where different

courts decided nearly the same

problems

ways.

in different

This thesis will try to give an introduction
different
actions

in

into the

systems of judicial review of administrative

of the United States and Germany.

a short introduction
administrative

into the different

agencies

In this first part

legal systems and

will be given. Part II will explain

the system of judicial review of administrative
Germany.

on

After describing

actions

in

against which administrative

actions there is the possibility

to obtain

jUdicial review

J.Wieland, "Der Zugang zum Bundesverfassunsggericht
und
zum Supreme Court", p.333, in: "Der Staat" 29, (1990),

8

this is the main aim of the BVerfG towards the individual
but it of course has other constitutional cases, like e.g.
claims between the federal and state governments or the
verification of compatibility of laws with the Grundgesetz
9

6

there will be sections

concerning

review has to be obtained,

which different

well as when these lawsuits
successful.

the time when jUdicial

will be admitted

In Part III the american

review of administrative
part will contain

a general

and will be

system of jUdicial

overview

as well as a description

reviewable

by courts.

to obtain

This

of the judicial

review

of the actions which are

There furthermore

with the scope of review

are necessary

exist as

actions will be presented.

in general

dealing

lawsuits

will be a section

and the requirements

that

judicial review of administrative

actions.
Part IV then will be engaged with the examination
comparison

of the respective

influences

on the development

historic

and the

and cultural

of the legal systems

general

and especially

action.

In this part the source of law, the purpose

the jUdicial review of administrative

aims of the law as well as the attitude
government

and the administrative

Part V will summarize
concerning

the respective
system.
different

attitudes

towards

will be examined.

and similarities

actions.

actions

them in order with

the law and the political

then will state the impacts of the

legal systems on the jUdicial review of

administrative

and the

the

review of administrative

and will arrange

The Conclusion

towards

agencies

the differences

the judicial

the two legal systems

in

in

7

1) administrative

judicial branch

An important

difference

between the german and the

legal system

is that there is the common belief

that a judge should not be specialized

u.s.

in the

in a certain

u.s.

field of

law.
Instead of that the judge should be able to judge the cases
and problems

that arise in different

fields of law. This

system relies on the belief that people who are able to
judge problems

in a general way are much better

in obeying

the common sense and with this finding the law of the
people.
In the F.R.G. - though of course the law is meant to serve
the needs of the people - there are too many laws, the law
is too complex
legally trained

and there are too many special rules even for
persons to judge all legal problems

that may

arise.
Therefore,

there is not only the necessity

to let people

who have been legally trained work with the law but more
than that there are different
important

legal SUbjects;

(a) civil law courts,

jUdicial branches

for the most

the three main court branches

(b) administrative

law courts and

are

8

(c)"criminal
Furthermore
problems

law courts.~
there are special courts that deal with legal

in commerce

law, labor law, there are fiscal and

social courts.
There are five Supreme Courts in Germany above which there
still is the Federal Constitutional
all state bodies,
themselves,
To divide

including

the supreme Federal Courts

to ensure adherence
judges on different

of distrust

Court "which monitors

to the constitution".11

legal subjects

is not a sign

in their legal (or even intellectual)

capacity

but it is the proper way to ensure a fast and reliable
judicial branch because

"only a well - timed jUdicial review

is a just judicial review".u
Too many special problems

arise in each field of law and it

would take too much time for jUdges to adjust themselves
the sometimes

very different

to

topics.

10 The opinion of Peter L. Strauss that the existence of
a special administrative court would violate the separation
of powers because the administrative court would put too
much power to the executive branch therefore is not
necessarily correct unless the administrative court would be
a part of the administrative agency; see: Peter L. Strauss,
"An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United
States", p. 211, (1989)
11 President of the Federal Constitutional Court Prof. Dr.
Roman Herzog, "The Separation and Concentration of Power in
the Basic Law", 391,392, in: "Germany and its Basic Law",
ed. by P.KirchhofjD.Kommers,
(1993)
U Justice
Prof. Dr. P.Kirchhof, " Gegenwartsfragen
an das
Grundgesetz", in: 44 Juristische Zeitung, 453,464 (1989)

9

Because

of this there is an own judicial branch that deals

only with administrative

law which is quite necessary

there are many different

fields of administrative

Administrative

law in Germany can be divided

(1) the first part is the "general"
regulates

with or towards
due process

subjects

agencies

law, building

administrative

the different

and

are working with: this

law, municipal

law,

law and many more, in short: it contains

law (except for constitutional
the citizens

The "general"
fairness

different

administrative

regulative

rules of

and fairness:

can be police

between

law that

it has to obey by doing anything

a citizen as well as the general

law and contains

public

into two parts:

administrative

(2) the second part is called the "special"

immigration

law.

the forms of actions an agency may choose to

take, the procedures

special

as

all

law) that occurs

and the administrative

and

acting sovereign.
administrative

and equality

law is federal law to ensure

in procedural

in the same way, the "special"

rights for all citizens

administrative

law is enacted

by each of the 16 states, GG art 70 (1), and therefore
may vary slightly

it

from state to state.

To take legal action against an act/order

of an

administrative

agency there are three instances

administrative

courts. The first is the "ordinary"

administrative

court of which there are several

the states. The second instance

of

in each of

is the higher administrative

10

is one in each state.13 The

court of which there usually

court of the last resort is the Bundesverwaltungsgericht14
which's

decision

The decision

is not final though,

constitutionally
plaintiff

is final in matters

guaranteed

of administrative

if it interferes

decision

with

rights of the plaintiff.

then may try to defend him- or herself

law.

The

against

the

of the F.A.C. before the Federal Constitutional

Court.
The plaintiff

may sue before the F.C.C. if he/she

the formal requirements
signify

in a plausible

guaranteed
Federal

rights

where he/she especially
way that his/her

are harmed through

Administrative

fulfills

has to

constitutionally

the decision

of the

Court.

2) the rule of law
The "rule of law" whether
as an active-duty

of the sovereign

not the) main necessities
and political

system.

law" may be different
backbone

seen as an abstract

principle

power is one of the (if

of a democratic

and just society

The means of guaranteeing
from country

or

to country.

the "rule of
But as a

to ensure this rule of law a Constitution

has to

13 some states have two; also the names may differ from
state to state: in some states the higher administrative
court is called "Verwaltungsgerichtshof",
in some it is
called "Oberlandesgericht"
14 Bundesverwaltungsgericht
(BVerwG), Federal
Administrative
Court (F.A.C.), located in Berlin

11

either guarantee
of sovereign
"actors"

the possibility

actions

jUdicial

review

judicial

review

or it has to take care that the

of the sovereign

to act arbitrary

to obtain

without

power do not have the possibility
ensuring

for the concerned

the possibility

to obtain

people.

a) "rule of law" in Germany
As mentioned

above the first and main purpose

legal system

is not necessarily

but to guarantee

instead

to obey the people's

and rely on a just legal system.

this the "fathers"
democratic

of the constitution

"instruments"

like e.g. the referendum

of that just relied on the representative

"fathers"

of the constitution

it is sad if a country

receives

late - there nevertheless
the "fathers"

learned

cultural

democracy.

from history.15 Though

have had'the
learned

from constitutions

and from the history

of

but

very

is the good thing about it that

of the constitution

in Germany,

Because

and the

a good constitution

to think about lessons and conflicts
constitutions

will

did not invent some

This is one of the main lessons the Germans

countries

of the german

possibility

from earlier
in other

as well as from social and

development.

15 see: K. stern, "General Assessment of the Basic Law - A
German View",17,19, in: "Germany and its Basic Law" ed. by
P.Kirchhof/D.Kommers
(1993); history has shown that
"people's will" is not necessarily consistent with prior
"wishes" and that referendum's can be "directed" in a
special direction

12

And though the german constitution
"fathers"
history

of the constitution

well and embodied

guidelines

40 times the

had learned their lesson from

the important

for a free democratic

law in the constitution

was amended

without

requirements

and

country obeying the rule of
the possibility

to ever

change them.u
The rule of law (or at least its main expression)
down in GG art 20 (3) 17: "The legislator
constitutional

order, the executive

is written

has to obey the

and judiciary

shall be

bound by law and justice".
Combined

with the impossibility

of the constitution
guarantee

to ever change this article

- GG art. 79 (3) - this is the biggest

in favor of the rule of law. Nevertheless

are several other articles

of the constitution

there

that embody

the rule of law.
The F.C.C. always tried to avoid fixing itself on a certain
point of view whether

the principle

16
GG art. 79 (3): the most
Constitution can never ever
"eternity - article"); this
mistake of the Constitution
1933) that otherwise obeyed
law; see: E.Schmidt-Assmann,

of the rule of law was

important articles of the
be changed (the so called
was one, if not the biggest
of the Weimarer Republic (1919the principle of the rule of
supra note 2, 987,996

though most of the scholars believe that the principle
of the rule of law is embodied in GG art. 20 (3) - some
scholars believe that this principle is written down in GG
articles 28 (1), 20 (1), see: E.Schmidt-Assmann,
supra
note 2, pp.987,989; see also: President of the Federal
Constitutional Court Roman Herzog, "Kommentar zu
Art. 20 GG, (II Abschnitt)", pp.20-26, in: Maunz/Duerig,
"Kommentar zum Grundgesetz", (1993)
17

13

embodied

in GG art 20 (3) or in GG art 28 (1) but instead of

that in its decisions
as a general

the Court spoke about the rule of law

principle

of the constitution.18

The Federal Constitutional
was not enacted

in a few written

rather is a combination
reflected
purpose

b)

Court said that this principle
sentences

but that it

of many principles

in the whole established

of the Grundgesetz.

and ideals

system, organization

19

rule of law in the United states

In the U.S. the rule of law is not explicitly
Constitution.
Constitution

Certain

and through
guarantee
personal
Reasons

of certain

the whole structure

of a "dichotomy
discretion

for not explicitly

principle

K.Stern,

in the
in the

of powers" due process

fundamental

human rights

of the Constitution

the

between general rule of law and

to do justice"20

(a) that the "framers"

enacted

features of course are secured

like e.g. the separation

of law, the assurance

U

and

mentioning

is promised.
the rule of law may be

of the Constitution

held the

of the rule of law as an obvious content of the

supra, note 15, p.613

Judgement of July 1st 1953, Bundesverfassungsgericht,
1st senate, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
2,380,403, (later: BVerfGE 2,380,403)

19

see: Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, "The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules", 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1175, (1989)

20

14

whole Constitution
between

common

understanding

and that (b) there may be differences

law and civil law systems

of what the rule of law really is.

The rule of law may be a "higher"
providing

law or a general

"instruments"

through a variety

like e.g. open findings,

the unnecessary

decisions23

enacted by Congress.

of different

open precedents

and

use of discretion.22

Rule of law in the U.S. means supremacy
individual

principle

justice and judicial review of governmental

actions21 which is achieved

avoiding

in the essential

of law over

which of course includes

the law

24

21
K. C. Davis, "Administrative
pp. 97-117, (1978)

Law Treatise",

Vol. I,

22

K.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol.I, p.117

23

K.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol. I, pp. 97 - 102

A plain distinction between the difference in the
meanings of the "rule of law" in the United Stated and
Germany is e.g. that in the U.S. the "due process of law" is
constitutional guaranteed only for cases where "life,
liberty or property" are at stake. In all other cases
judicial review either is guaranteed within the explicit
statute or it is not possible to obtain, see:
R.Pierce,Jr./S.Shapiro/p.verkuil,
"Administrative Law and
Process", p. 124, 2nd ed., (1992); in Germany jUdicial
review can be obtained if a right/entitlement
of the person
is violated whereby a right/entitlement
can be given not
only by the Constitution but by every code whereby the
statute does not have to state that there is the possibility
to obtain jUdicial review
24

15

The rule of law requires
sovereign

that the agencies

power do not act arbitrary25

concerning

acting for the

or can be controlled

their legal decisions/actions.

Not the abstrac~

rule of law is the main aim of the Constitution
ensure a "liberal"
laws"u

democracy

but to

with "equal protection

of the

for every citizen.

B) Differences

in Purpose and Aim of the Administrative

Agencies

1) administrative
The administrative

agencies
agencies

in Germany
in Germany

exist to execute the

laws and the regulations.
structure

and purpose

accomplish
agencies
executing

of the administrative

the rule of law and therefore

are a neutral sovereign

agencies

are dependent

the administrative

Bound to the law the
on the normative

25

see: K.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol. I, p.104

26

U.S.Constitution

14th Amendment

aim to

- body (or branch)

the laws of the legislator.27

administrative

agencies

sec.1

27
see: Rudolf DOlzer, "Verwaltungsermessen
und
Verwaltungskontrolle
in den Vereinigten staaten",
in: "Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung", 578,579, (1982)

legal

16

status.28 The legislator
agencies

can influence

insofar as agencies

legislator

can organize

can be closed or that the

new agencies.

by doing this - attach importance
it thinks are more important
of all most agencies

the administrative

The legislator

may _

to certain subjects

than other subjects.

that

But first

that do exist in Germany can not be

closed29 and even if the legislator

creates new agencies

_

as they have to obey the rule of law they are working

in an

objective

by

and neutral way which can not be influenced

certain political
The executive
because

interests

or "visions".

branch has no influence

the "fathers"

at al130 especially

of the Constitution

to create only a few federal agencies,
Most of the administrative

agencies

federal but county or city agencies.
agencies

are not involved

made it possible

GG art. 87 (3).3~

therefore

are not

These administrative

in the political

process.

Ernst Forsthoff, "Lehrbuch des Verwal tungsrechts,
Allgemeiner Teil", p.14, 9th ed., (1966)
28

because they are needed to administrate
necessities"

29

the "daily

except on very few agencies like e.g. the "Deutsche
Bundespost" (German postal service) where the head of the
"agency" is an executive secretary

30

31 dealing
with the ability to create new agencies:
Judgement of February 28th 1961, 2nd senate,
BVerfGE 12,205,229

17

2) administrative
In the United

agencies

states the administrative

close to the executive
process.32

in the united states

of art. II

care that the laws be faithfully
agencies

of

because he is

that the " ... laws be

•••".

Though the administrative
have broad powers

" ..•shall take

executed ..• ". As the

on the agencies

the person who is responsible
executed

3 of the U.s.

execute the laws the President

course has to have influence

faithfully

§

which rules that the President

administrative

are very

and are a part of the political

This is a necessity

Constitution

agencies

agencies

in "executing

do execute the laws they

the laws". They have quasi _

legislative

and quasi-judicial

power.33

legislative

and quasi-judicial

powers can be very broad. As

long as Congress

enacts an "intelligible

the agency must conform

••. ".34

strike down the particular
delegates

legislative

defers to the specific

~ R.Dolzer,

33

These quasi-

principle

to which

the judicial branch will not

delegation.35

Congress

often

powers quite broadly because
knowledge

of the agency.

supra note 27, 578,579

see: R.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol. I, p.182

J.W.Hampton, Jr & Co V. United states,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)

34

35
to the history of the nondelegation doctrine see:
M. Strobel, "Delegation and Individual Rights",
56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1321,1322 (1983)

Congress

18

As an administrative
decisions36

the jUdicial branch is restrained

those decisions
political

agency may make "legislative"

because

it will not decide

controlling

"legislative"

questions.

More than that the courts put more weight on verifying
formal instead of the objective
because the administrative
"technical
working

expertise""

the

parts of an agency decision

agency has special knowledge

or

in the special topic they are

with. 38

Though the administrative

agencies

part only of the executive
independent
exercise

or

agencies

judicial

have traditionally

branch Congress

because Congress

functions"

been a

created

wanted

"agencies

to be independent39

that

and

~ the "intelligible principle" nevertheless allows
Congress to delegate a broad amount of authority; "Broad
delegations of power by Congress have been justified as
necessary to deal with the realities of modern Government",
see: M.Strobel, supra note 35, 1321,1328
Richard Nagareda, "Ex Parte Contacts and Institutional
Roles: Lessons from the OMB Experience", 55 U.Chi.L.Rev.
591,593 (1988)
37

R. Dolzer, supra note 27, 578,580; Hans D. Jarass,
"Besonderheiten des amerikanischen Verwaltungsrechts
im
Vergleich", in: "Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung", 377,378,
(1985)
38

~ K.C.Davis,
(1975)

"Administrative

Law and Government",

p.17,

19

"freedom

from the Presidential

domination".

40

that arose though was whether the "independent"

The question
agencies

were constitutional.41
The President's
diminished
independent

influence

considerably
agencies

to the President's

on these independent

agencies

as he may remove officers

is

of those

only for cause.42 This can be contrary

constitutional

duty "to take care that

19

"freedom

from the Presidential

domination".

The question

40

that arose though was whether the "independent"

agencies

were constitutional.41
The President's
diminished
independent

influence

considerably
agencies

to the President's

on these independent

as he may remove officers

constitutional

of those

duty "to take care that

executed".

The Supreme

Court so far held the existence

independent

agencies

administrative

is

only for cause.42 This can be contrary

the laws be faithfully

The executive

agencies

nevertheless

of these

constitutional.43

has broad powers as it controls
agencies

but as the President

laws which are made by Congress

the
executes

the separation

the

of powers are

Mashaw/Merrill/Shane,
"Administrative Law, The American
Public Law system", p.24, 3rd ed. (1992)

40

this may be questioned as "independence and separation
of powers are linked concepts", see: P.Verkuil, "Separation
of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence",
in: 30 Wm & M.L.Rev. 301,322, (1989); it therefore can be
difficult for the President to fulfill his constitutionally
demanded tasks
41

"The condition that makes the independent agencies truly
independent is a statutory restriction on removal for
cause", P.Verkuil, supra note 41, 301,330
42

43
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.
2d 569 (1988)

20

balanced.

44

Even though the President

on the agencies45

has great influence

the organic acts of the agencies

are made

by Congress.

see: G.Robinson, " Independent Agencies: Form and
Substance in Executive Prerogative", in: 1988 Duke L.J. 238,
243, (1988)
44

45
such as: "appointment of members, budgetary controls and
simple power of persuasion", G.Robinson, supra note 44,
p. 238,245

Part

II

POSSIBILITY

OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW

IN THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM

1) jUdicial review of what kind of administrative

a)

actions?

no "numerus clausus"

In a civil law system rights and duties are written
codes. Because

of this a problem may arise if a certain

right is needed

(and though the existence/need

may be generally
available

accepted)

because

an especially

it is not enacted

dangerous

and no suitable

situation

is not

in a code. This can be

if there should be the

lawsuit is available

VwGO. This is quite uncomfortable

possibility

of this right

this right nevertheless

need to take legal action against a certain

situations

down in

sovereign

for the citizen

action
in the

as irretrievable

and facts may be established

if there is not the

to take legal action against the sovereign.

Though the legislator

may enact restrictive

for the admissibility

of lawsuits46

presuppositions

it may not prohibit

the

see: E. SChmidt-Assmann,
"Kommentar zu Art. 19 (4) GG",
in: Maunz/Duerig "Kommentar zum Grundgesetz", p.127, (1993);
the federa~ legislator enacted the VwGO as "final" code for
procedural requirements so that the states may not establish
new procedural rules or requirements for the administrative
courts, GG art. 74 No 1; see: Judgement of February 17th
1981, 7th senate, BVerwGE 61,360,363
46

21
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possibility

to obtain

possibility

to take only certain

same as to prohibit

jUdicial review.47 To ensure the

the possibility

review in some circumstances.
to enact only certain
that it is possible

legal actions would be the

lawsuits48

to obtain

if there is the guarantee

judicial review with other
lawsuits whenever

should be the need for it. Therefore
of the possibilities

lawsuits

there

there is no "numerus

of the lawsuits.

should be the need for legal protection
enacted

judicial

Because of this it is possible

legal actions than the enacted

clausus"

to obtain

If there

and none of the

would really help to reach the required

there of course nevertheless

is the possibility

aim

to sue.

b) action/inaction
As it is known that an inaction can cause the same damage as
an action can the legal action may be brought

against agency

actions as well as inactions.
The agency may reject to act in a desired way or it may just
work very slowly so that after a certain period of time it
is unreasonable

for the citizen to wait any longer.49

The

47 Judgement
of April 15th 1980, 2nd senate,
BVerwGE 54,94,97

though the states may not create and enact new types of
lawsuits, Judgement of October 11th 1966, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 20,238,251
48

49
Walter Schmitt Glaeser, "Verwaltungsprozessrecht",
pp.172,179, 11th ed. 1992

23

agency may act in a way the citizen does not want to endure
and which he/she does not have to endure.
The main question

therefore

is not whether the agency acted

or did not act but if the rights or legal entitlements
the citizen

c)

are or have been restricted.

judicial review of all administrative

The same is true concerning
different

of

actions?

the possibility

to review

forms the agency choose to act or cases where the

agency did not want to act.
Whether

the agency enacted an administrative

act, order,

statute or just gave advice does not matter at all
(concerning

the question

if there is judicial review or if

there is not).
"The protection

of the GG art 19 (4) is available

what type of administrative

no matter

action the administrative

agency

choose".~
There are different
the different

lawsuits to take legal action against

types of action but after all those types of

actions are artificial

and do only exist to serve a certain

purpose.

d) jUdicial review of discretionary
Many statutes
finding

50

decisions

give the administrative

a decision

E.Schmidt-Assmann,

after weighing

of the agency

agency discretion

the legal and factual

supra note 46, p.41

in

24

arguments

and possibilities.

The court of course may not

substitute

its own opinions

for those of the agency. The

discretionary

decision

has to be controlled,
VwVfG

of the agency nevertheless

can be and

at least to some extent.51

40 rules that while the agency uses discretion

§

has to use this in the sense of the respective
agency may not infringe

law and the

the legal limits of the discretion.

There are four types of mistakes
using its discretionary

it

an agency can make while

power and which can be controlled

by

the court

*

if an agency makes a decision

based on facts that do not

*

if an agency makes a decision

thinking

certain

limits of discretion

exist in this concrete

whereas

that there are

those limits do.not

case53;

*

if the decision

*

if the agency does not really use its discretion

of the agency was arbitrary54;

not put any weigh on the individual
standardize

51

supra note 49, p.99

"Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz",

Judgement of February
BVerfGE 9,137,147-149

53

case but instead acts to

its acts.

see: W. Schmitt Glaeser,

F.Kopp,
(1983)

52

and does

p.576

, 3rd ed.

3rd 1959, 2nd senate,

Bundesverwaltungsgericht,
Judgement of September 27th
1978, in: 32 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift pt 2, 1112,1113

54

25

If the agency makes mistakes

within those four categories

the court can find them out. Other decisions

of the agency _

even though the agency could have made better decisions
are within their discretionary

_

power and not justiciable.

2) at what time can jUdicial review be obtained?

a) usually
Usually

the agency has acted

jUdicial review can only be obtained

the administrative

if an action of

agency already has happened

because only

unless you know of a certain act or order you can react.
If a person receives
react within

an administrative

act he/she has to

a certain period of time because there is only

a limited period of time in which a lawsuit can be brought
to a court, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung55,
To keep the administrative

§

74 (1)(1 month).

agency efficient

and in order

there are certain time limits until when an action, a
complaint

or a pretrial

for administrative

review

(Vorverfahren)

may be brought

review to the agency, VwGO sec. 68 (1).

This period of time only starts running the day the
addressee

receives

was declared

the administrative

to him in his/her

act or on the day it

presence,

not the day it was

released.

Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung
(VwGO), rules of the
administrative courts; Beck-Texte im dtv, 19th ed. November,
1st 1993
55

26

There are different
require

circumstances

a court's decision

administrative

possible

though that may

or action before an

act is released:

(aa) it is possible

that an

agency did not react within a certain period of time to a
certain

request by a person,

permission,
plausible

e.g. request

(VwGO sec. 75: 3 months);
and foreseeable

for a building

(bb) if there is the

chance that the agency will act in

a certain way which will harm subjective
and (cc) there furthermore

rights of- a person

is the possibility

that there is

the urgent need for a person to uphold a certain
or legal status before it is changed
administrative

situation

irretrievably

by the

agency.

to (aa): The lawsuit needed to take legal action if the
administrative

agency did not act within 3 months - VwGO

sec. 75 - though requested
(action against
performance

is called Verpflichtungsklage

a public authority

of an administrative

and will be discussed

b) provisional

act for one's benefit)

under d).

jUdicial review

to (bb): There are different
actions

to compel the

in advance

possibilities

to take legal

if there is the foreseeable

and plausible

chance that the agency will act in a certain way. This
prevential

judicial review is a constitutional

necessity

- deriving

guarantee

the possibility

the efficiency

demand and

from GG art 19 (4). Not only to
to obtain

jUdicial review but also

of this judicial review is guaranteed

through

27
56

the Grundgesetz.

Derived from GG art 19 (4) the right to

have an efficient

judicial review became one of the

fundamental

rights of the german constitution.57

review is a necessity
the courts.

to assure an efficient

Prevential

protection

58

c) preventive

jUdicial review

to (cc): Citizens

must have the possibility

to obtain

jUdicial review of certain actions that otherwise
diminish

a certain

review in Germany

entitlement

decisions

executi ve branch.

to avoid even the possibility

may establish

legal status quo. Provisional
reliance

jUdicial review and

19 (4), 20 (3). This kind of

judicial review is necessary
that arbitrary

would

or legal right. This jUdicial

is called provisional

is a result of GG articles

of providing

by

an unwanted

or unjust

jUdicial review is a mixture

in the legal system and control

of the

59

56
Judgement of November 12th 1958, 2nd senate,
BVerfGE 8,274,326; Judgement of July 18th 1973, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 35,382,400

Judgement of April 2nd 1969, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 37,67,77

57

Judgement of September 8th 1972, Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 4th senate, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts
40,323,326, (later: BVerwGE
40,323.326)
58

59

see: E.Schmidt-Assmann,

supra, note 2, 987,1030
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3)

the judicial review

a) formless

remedies

There are three possibilities

to complain

actions of the administrative

agencies within the respective

agency. There is a remonstrance,

about certain

a request

for

administrative

review as well as a request

for

administrative

review by a superior

legal remedies

these three remedies/complaints

the claimant
protest

officer.

In contrast

to

do not lead

to a court and in most cases they are used to

against

certain actions that do not have a legal

impact. But they can be taken prior or even at the same time
of obtaining

judicial review against the same action.

These are "complaints"
against
behavior

a certain

which are expressed

by an individual

action of an administrative

agency or

of one or several of their

ministerial/administrative

officers

and these complaints

will be judged only by the administrative
These complaints
administrative

agency itself.

may be about a certain act of the

agency, an unfriendly

civil servant or the

wish to have a certain act or an agency officer controlled
by a superior
Those

officer.

"complaints"

addressed

can be made by everybody

by the action or who has contacts

administrative

agency without

formal requirements.

who has been
with an

any time limits or other

29

They may be not as efficient

as obtaining

judicial

a court60 but they often are faster than a decision
court and are about complaints

review by
of a

that may be not important

enough to go before a court. And even if a'complaint
be denied

there usually

b) distinction

between

still is the chance to file a suit.

admissibility

The judge who judges a lawsuit
first he/she
fulfilled

examines

whether

and then he/she

The review

and success

is doing this in two steps:
the formal requirements

of a lawsuit therefore

as the review on the merits,
and therefore

verification
Without
review

is divided

of the legal problems

jUdicial
Thereby

legal problems.

but to avoid misuse of the

- the legislator

requirements
branch working

the legislator

standards

lies on the jUdicial

- which would lead to serious disadvantages

for the whole society
procedural

it is not as

does not take as long as the

of the controversial

branch

into two parts

can be as enduring

though usually

any doubt the main importance

jUdicial

are

judges on the merits.

and the review of the formal requirements

difficult

should

has to enact certain

to ensure the ability
in an efficient

way.

has to obey certain

- esp. those required

of the

limits and

by GG art 19 (4) - but as

as this is still the agency deciding over complaints
made about officers or actions of the agency itself it is
clear that a conflict of interests may arise. Nevertheless
the establishment of these complaints was/is an expression
of confidence in certain principles
60

30

long as these procedural
constitutional

rights these procedural

other requirements
citizens/plaintiffs
the functioning

c)

and sometimes

even

have to be accepted6~ by the
as a legal demand

in order to conserve

of the jUdicial branch.

action to rescind

When an administrative
object

rules do not diminish

or subject

/ Anfechtungsklage
agency wants to regulate

against

small group of persons

a certain

or in favor of an individual

or a

- in most cases it will enact an

administrative

act. This is a special way to act because

administrative

act is enacted

small group

(where the affected

have to know each other)
but nevertheless

in VwGO

62

an individual

persons

do not necessarily

and therefore

it is "personal"

§

/Anfechtungsklage

- which is

42 (1) - is the proper way to sue an

administrative

agency because

administrative

act this legal action probably

often used remedy.
reached

or a

this act is legally binding.

As the action to rescind
enacted

towards

an

of the enaqtment

The aim of the plaintiff

of an
is the most

that can be

with this remedy is to cancel the administrative

Judgement of January 12th 1960, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 10,264: with this decision the BVerfG upheld a rule
demanding an advanced payment for court costs
6~

a "small group" can be several people but not that many
as that they could not be individualized by certain
characteristics
62
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act. If a court finds that the administrative
unlawful
aa)

it will declare

act is

this act void, VwGO

113 (1).

§

The act against which this lawsuit can be taken

necessarily
definition

must be an administrative
in VwVfG

administrative
components:

35 that explicitly

act is. There especially

says what an
have to be five

the act must be (1) a sovereign

administrative
regulate

§

act. There is a

agency dealing with

an individual

act of an (2)

(3) public

law to (4)

case that has an (5) external

affection.63
The action to rescind may also be taken against
administrative
fulfilled/obeyed
very evidently
validity

act64 because

an administrative

unless a court declares
invalid.

act has to be

it void or if it is

But as a false diagnosis

of the administrative

of the

act by the addressee

course

the sole problem

better

to take legal action to make sure whether

invalid

an invalid

of the addressee

it usually

is of
is

the act is

or not.

bb) If the administrative

act can be divided

parts and these different

parts still make sense a plaintiff

may sue only against

into several

the part that he dislikes,

113 (1). This is very useful

VwGO sec.

if only one part of the act

see: F. Kopp, supra note 52, pp. 462 - 502; external in
the sense that something is ordered against the addressee
that other people not directly affected nevertheless do
notice (or at least: can notice)
63

64

F.Kopp,

"Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung",

p 176, 6th ed.1984
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incriminates
favoring

the addressee

while the rest of the act is

his interests.

The court then will declare void only the part against which
the plaintiff

sued while the rest of the act will be upheld

even if it should be unlawful.

This is written

down in VwGO

sec. 88 that rules that the court is bound to the claim of
the plaintiff.~
VwGO

§§

88,113

(1) explaines

against the complete
declare

administrative

act void that

while the rest of the act will be

That clarilies

an administrative

sued

act the court will

only these parts of the administrative

really are unlawful
upheld.

that if the plaintiff

that there is no use in suing against

act just because the plaintiff

dislikes

it.
If the administrative
(legally required)
plaintiff

administrative

pretrial

in the

review but the

still wants to take legal action against the

administrative

act - not the original

form it received
reviewed

act was changed or amended

through this pretrial

by the court, VwGO

cc) What is important
administrative

§

but the act in the
review will be

79.

is the fact that the execution

act still must be possible

the administrative

or - vice versa:

act may not be settled/executed

~ F. Kopp, supra note 64

of the

33

irretrievable

or canceled

the time the plaintiff

act is executed

or settled - because

first obeyed the act and then went to court or

because the administrative
urgent and overweighing

is the correct

VwGO sec. 80 (2) -

the action to rescind nevertheless

first has to take action in an

pretrial

review, VwGO sec. 68 (1), and this

may take some time there may be circumstances
administrative

because of

legal action.

As the plaintiff
administrative

act had to be executed

public interests,

but still can be reversed

act settled

protect the addressee
§§

agency66 at

starts legal proceedings.

If the administrative
the plaintiff

by the administrative

in which the

itself. To avoid this and to

of the administrative

80,80a rule that while taking a pretrial

act VwGO
review or a

legal action before a court this administrative

act may not

be enforcedjimplemented.67
If the administrative

act settled itself and actually

nothing has changed or is happening
nevertheless

is the possibility

agency because

66

to sue the administrative

of a legal wrong they tried to enforce with

this act or just because
implemented

anymore there

this meanwhile

a certain negative

see: W. Schmitt Glaeser,

settled act

status on the plaintiff

of

supra note 49, p.90

except in those cases mentioned above where there is an
overweighing pUblic interest, VwGO sec. 80 (2)

67
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which he tries to get rid of. This legal action is called
Fortsetzungsfeststellungsklage
dd) The plaintiff
addressee

does not necessarily

of the administrative

be among the addressees
important
that there
several

(FFK).
have to be the sole

act, he/she does not have to

at all. Instead of that it is

that the plaintiff

can show in a plausible

is the very likely possibility

of his subjective

personal

way

that one or even

public rights have been

harmed.
The action
claimed

to rescind

is successful

legal subjective

right/position

is harmed

administrative

act.

d) writ of mandamus

position/right

and if this

in an unlawful

way through

has the

this

/ Verpflichtungsklage

The Verplichtungsklage
administrative

if the plaintiff

is a legal action to condemn

agency to enact a desired

to which the plaintiff

an

administrative

has to have a legal right, VwGO

act
§

42

(1) 2nd alternative.
The aim of the lawsuit therefore
desired
acting

action

from the administrative

a certain

agency that is not

as it should.

There are two possibilities
(1) the citizen
administrative
applied

is to enforce

why this lawsuit may be used:

may have applied

for a certain

act at the competent

and nevertheless

agency. When the citizen

the agency did not act within

3

35

months,

the citizen may use this lawsuit to enforce

decision,

VwGO

(2) a citizen

§

75;

may use this lawsuit to enforce

administrative

a

a certain

act from the agency if he/she had applied

an administrative
administrative

act but the agency refused

to enact this

act. The reasons why the agency did not want

to enact this administrative
citizen

concerning

against

the agency.

his/her

act are irrelevant

for the

right to take legal action

aa) Just as the Anfechtungsklage

the Verpflichtungsklage

only be used in cases concerning

an administrative

plaintiff

must have the desire to receive

bb) Before going to court the plaintiff

success,

(at the agency

cc) The plaintiff
harmad

through

in a plausible

way that he has a subjective

§

rights may be

the desired

act. Furthermore

VwGO

agency did

level).

the agency by not enacting

desired

the plaintiff

administrative

has to prove

pUblic right to
act from the

42 (2). This public right must be harmed

if the agency refused to enact the administrative
explained above under (2)

68

any

against which the citizen

has to claim that his/her

demand this certain

42 (1).

agency without

administrative

agency,

§

VwGO sec. 68 (1). If the administrative

may complain

act. The

has to have obtained

review68 at the administrative

not act at all there is nothing

can

an administrative

act, not just any action of the agency, VwGO

a pretrial

for

act as

36

through either rejecting

the application

or through not

acting at all. The agency may enact a certain part of the
desired administrative

act but may nevertheless

enact other parts.69 The plaintiff

refuse to

may sue against this

partial denial of his/her desire as well.
dd) The citizen must have applied /asked for the
administrative

act at the competent

administrative

agency because the administrative

have the legitimate
administrative

and responsible

right and entitlement

act respectively

agency must

to enact an

dealing with a topic the

citizen asked for.
ee) If the application
rejected

to enact an administrative

by the administrative

act was

agency the plaintiff

has to

take legal action within 1 month since the day he received
notice of the rejection,
ff) If the plaintiff

VwGO

§

wins the lawsuit the administrative

agency either will be condemned
act ("Spruchreife")
administrative

74 (2).

to enact a certain specified

or it may be condemned

act regarding

to enact an

the legal opinion of the court

about a certain topic ("Bescheidungsurteil").
ff a) "Spruchreife":
are fulfilled

if the legal and factual assumptions

and no other requirements

this certain specified

and required

are needed to enact

administrative

court will order the agency to enact explicitly
act.

69

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

supra note 49, p. 175

act the

this desired

37

ff b) "Bescheidungsurteil":
administrative

the court orders the

agency to enact the required

act whereby the agency has discretion

administrative

in factual but not in

legal matters.

e) action for a declaratory

judgement

(Feststellungsklage)

As the name of this legal action already elucidates

- people

using this lawsuit do not want to receive or reject a
certain action but instead of that want to have clarity
about a legal relationship,
VwGO

§

43 that regulates

judgement

status or legal act.

the action for a declaratory

lists two possibilities

when this legal action can

be useful:
(1) the action for a declaratory
legal action to ascertain
administrative

administrative
declared

the invalidity

act. Different

aims at the declaration

judgement

is the correct

of an

from the Anfechtungsklage

of the illegality

act this administrative

invalid. An administrative

of an

act has to be

act is invalid if e.g.

an agency enacted this act without beeing authorized
statute to enact an administrative
invalid administrative

possible

act has no legal authority

or power

70

power this act may be - solely through the
appearance

See: E.Forsthoff,

by

act like this.70 An

but as the act was enacted by an agency representing
sovereign

that

of legality - a burden for the

supra note 28, pp. 219,220

the
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addressee.

To free himself from this burden the citizen must

have the chance to let this act be declared
The invalid administrative
whereas

in contrast

invalid.

act has no legal power at all

to that the illegal administrative

is illegal but has to be obeyed by the addressee
court declares

the existence

to use this legal action is to

(positive) or non-existence

(negative) of a legal relationship,

VwGO

legal relationship

a concrete

has to establish

at least two legal personalities
to (1): If the plaintiff
of an administrative

case between

based on public law.71
the invalidity
necessarily

has

act within the meaning of the
§

35.72 The plaintiff

success at the competent

agency to have this administrative
§

43 (1). This

wants to ascertain

Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
applied without

§

act the act in question

to be an administrative

VWVfG

unless a

it void.

(2) The second possibility
ascertain

act

must have

administrative

act declared

invalid,

44 (5).

If the plaintiff

has had the chance to enforce his legal

rights with either the Verpflichtungsklage,
or the allgemeine

Leistungsklage

Anfechtungsklage

he can not file an action

Judgement of November 28th 1975, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 50,11,19; Judgement of June 26th 1981, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 62,342,351
71

Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
(VwVfG); code of the
different possibilities an administrative agency may act
Beck -Texte im dtv, 19 th ed. November 1st 1993
72
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for declaratory

judgement because this lawsuit is subsidiary

to the other legal actions, VwGO
aa) A pretrial
therefore

administrative

§

43 (2).

review is not possible

and

not required.

bb) There is no time limit within which the lawsuit must be
brought before a court.
cc) The plaintiff
necessarily
interest

has to have an entitled

a legal interest)

in an early decision

in the decision
of the court.73

affected may be of an economic,
nature.

interest

(not

and an
The interest

social or political

74

dd) The lawsuit is successful

if the administrative

invalid as a matter of fact or if the asserted
relationship

legal

exists or does not exist (however the plaintiff

claimed the relationship

to be).

f) Fortsetzungsfestellungsklage

(FFK)

This lawsuit mentioned

in VwGO

against administrative

acts that settled itself and

therefore

n

§

113 (1) sentence

4 is used

do not exist anymore. The aim is to have

this respective
therefore

act is

administrative

is an exception

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

act declared

illegal. The FFK

to the general rule that there

supra note 49, p. 200

VGH Baden Wuerttemberg, judgement of February 27th 1989,
in: 43 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (pt 1), 268 (1990)
(VGH, Verwaltungsgerichtshof,
higher administrative court)

74
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has to be either an action or an inaction to sue against.
Though enacted to serve GG art 19 (4) the FFK more likely is
a result of GG art 20 (3) and the principle
law. The sovereign
administrative

power - enacting

of the rule of

laws or acting through

agencies - has to be controlled

by the

judiciary and more than that the citizens must have the
right to restrain
administrative
therefore

against the appearance

act was correct though it was not and

did him/her a legal wrong. The sovereign

obligation

to avoid possibilities

appearance

or an impression

citizen.

that an enacted

addressee

in which a negative

of unlawfulness

When an administrative

has the

is thrown upon a

act (that orders the

to do or not to do a certain thing) settles itself

there is always the danger that a certain negative
impression

remains.

There are three possible

cases in which the FFK can be used:

(1) If an administrative

act settles itself after the

plaintiff

filed a lawsuit but before a decision

was made - the plaintiff

then can either withdraw

lawsuit or he can change the Anfechtungsklage
to a FFK.75 With this FFK the plaintiff
decision

aims to receive the

act has been illegal.

Judgement of December
BVerwGE 66,307

the

subsequently

of the court that the - by now - settled

administrative

75

of the court

1st 1982, 7th senate,
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(2) Another

possibility

to use the FFK is the case that an

administrative

agency rejected to enact a desired

administrative

act. Even if this desired administrative

should not be necessary
situation

changed)

anymore

act

(because e.g. the factual

there still is the possibility

to sue the

agency in some cases.
The aim of this FFK is the subsequent
that the rejection

declaratory

judgement

to enact the desired administrative

act

was illegal.~
(3) Analogous

to VwGO 113 (1) sent. 4 the FFK is possible

cases where the administrative
plaintiff

in

act settled itself before the

could take legal action with an

Anfechtungsklage.77
In this case no pretrial
(VwGO

§

settled

68 (1»

administrative

is necessary

review

if the administrative

act

itself before the time limit to take this pretrial

review was over. If the administrative

act settled itself

F.Kopp, supra note 64, p. 998; a case where this
subsequent declaratory judgement could be necessary is when
the owner of a property applied for a permission to build a
house on his property but this application was denied by the
competent agency. If the owner then wants to sell his
property it is of course less valuable than it would be
having the possibility to build a house. In this case the
owner has the urgent interest to let the refusing agency's
decision be declared illegal (if he really had the legal
entitlement to receive a building permission) so that more
people will be interested in buying this property because
they have the possibility to build a house; in this case the
owner has a respectable interest in a court's decision
76

W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 207; Judgement
February 9th 1967, 1st senate, BVerwGE 26, 161,165

77

of

42

after the time limit was over but the plaintiff
this pretrial

review - the lawsuit will not be admissed.78

aa) To pass the admissibility
requirements

did not take

examination

of the Anfechtungsklage

bb) The administrative

the formal

have to be fulfilled.

act must have settled itself after

the lawsuit was filed but before the court came to a
decision.~
cc) The plaintiff
Anfechtungsklage
dd) Furthermore

has to change80 the lawsuit from an
to a FFK.

the plaintiff

that the administrative
declared

religious

or any other nature.81 A special

is e.g. if there is the danger that an

administrative

act will be repeated.82

Judgement of February
BVerwGE 26,161,167

78

79

act that settled itself should be

illegal. This interest can be of legal, economic,

political,
interest

has to have a special interest

this is necessary

9th 1967, 1st senate,

only in case (1)

~ only in case (1)
VGH Baden Wuerttemberg, Judgement of February 27th 1989,
in: 43 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, (pt 1) 268, (1990)

81

Judgement of September
BVerwGE 16,312,316

82

3rd 1963, 1st senate,
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g) action requesting

a change of a legal right

There are several administrative

law lawsuits that contain

topics dealing with civil law, too. These lawsuits are not
used very often but they nevertheless
and useful.

can be very important

83

(1) There is the lawsuit to resumption
§

153 in combination

final administrative
procedural

§

57884, that aims to remove a

court decision

because of eminent

lawsuit is the petition
VwGO

§

173 in combination

for modification
with ZPO

aims at the removal of a final administrative
decision.

VwGO

mistakes.~

(2) Another
judgement,

with ZPO

of proceedings,

Reasons

§

of

323, that

courts

for this removal are changes in the state

of affairs or in the facts that lead the court to this
decision.86

The former decision was correct - based on the

facts that have been available

at the time the decision

made - but the facts available

right now would lead to a

different

was

result.

these lawsuits are not very important in the sense that
not very many people actually use them; of course this says
nothing about how important or useful they might be for the
people depending on them; trying to enlist all
administrative law remedies these should not miss here
83

84

Zivilprozessordnung,

85

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

86

Othmar Jauernig,

code of civil procedures
supra note 49, p.28

"Zivilprozessrecht",

p.226, 22ed. 1988
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(3) Furthermore
for avoidance
with ZPO

§

there is the possibility

of an arbitral

award, VwGO

ZPO

173 in connection

1041, because of formal or

§

mistakes.n

(4) The action raising an objection
is written down in VwGO
§

§

1043. In this case the removal of an arbitral

award can be demanded,
procedural

to bring an action

§

to the judgement claim

167 (1) in connection

767. This lawsuit is used to raise defenses

established

claim88,

with ZPO

against an

e.g. defense of performance,

waiver or

dath.

h) action for performance,

Allgemeine

This lawsuit is not explicitly

Leistungsklage

written down in the VwGO but

it is derived out of the whole system of the VwGO,
especially

keeping

in mind the fact that there is no numerus

clausus of the types of lawsuits. The legal sources of the
action for performance

are VwGO

§

40 (1) and VwGO

§

43 (2).

More than that this lawsuit can be seen as a result of GG
art 19 (4) in combination

with VwGO

§

40.89

This lawsuit is used to demand or to retrieve
of an administrative

n

o.

Jauernig,

agency.

It can be used to refrain from

supra note 86, pp. 325/326,

88
see: Rosenberg/Schwab,
ed. 1981

89

a certain act

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

"Zivilprozessrecht",

supra note 49, p.213

p. 967, 13th
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an administrative
demanded

act, too. Very important

or prevented

is that the

act may not be an administrative

act.~
aa) The desired or unwanted
administrative

and prevented

action of the

agency has to be an act with legal relevance,

though it may not be an administrative

act. It must be an

action of an agency concerning/dealing

with an individual

case.U
bb) The plaintiff
subjective
agency's

has to claim in a plausible

way that his

rights are hurt because of the administrative

action/inaction,

cc) A pretrial

VwGO

§

42 (2).

review is not necessary

and there is no time

limit until when legal action has to be taken.

i) Klageart

suis generis

Though it was planned92 to enact only certain types of
lawsuits the German Bundestag

stood away from that

intention.

Judgement of February
BVerwGE 31,301

90

25th 1969, 1st senate,

Whether the act really must deal with an individual case
is controversial; in favor: VGH Hessen, Judgement of March
15th 1968, DVBL 1969, 504; against: VGH Bayern, Judgement of
December 12th 1980, BayVBL 1981, 499,503; the VGH Bayern is
of the opinion that even statutes can be a matter of dispute
with this lawsuit; citations from Schmitt Glaeser, supra
note 49, p.215
9~

92 Bundestags
- Drucksachen 3/1955; cited from W. Schmitt
Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 223
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Taking this position the German Bundestag
certain enumeration
that otherwise
legal system.
Therefore

tried to avoid a

of types of lawsuits because they feared

they would enact an immovable and not useful

93

there is no numerus clausus of lawsuits today but

instead of that there is the possibility
art 19 (4) and of VwGO

§

before an administrative

- derived out of GG

40 - to take any legal action
court if the matter of dispute is

one of public law.
For example there nowadays

is a lawsuit called

"Kommunal verfassungsstrei t" (dispute between municipals )94
dealing with disputes

of municipal

cities. Though the existence
still is controversial95

law between counties

or

of this lawsuit as an own type

it shows the possibility

legal action without using one of the statutorily

to take
enacted

types of lawsuits.

keeping in mind that the German legal system relies on
statutes what means that these statutes have to be broad and
abstract to serve their purpose; though the legislator
enacted nearly all possibilities to take legal action they
kept in mind that the principle of the rule of law demands
more than that.
93

first named this way by the OVG Lueneburg, DOEV
1961,548; cited from W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49,
p. 224
94

95

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

supra note 49, p. 224
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j) Normenkontrollverfahren,

VwGO

§

47

This lawsuit is a mixture of a constitutional
administrative

and

law remedy.

As the name already points out it is used to control
regulations

on a level below federal or state laws.

The Federal Constitutional

Court controls

laws and their compatibility
articles
VwGO

with the constitution,

the right to declare void regulations
BauGB

§

GG

93 (1) No 2, 100 (1).%

47 gives the higher administrative

§

federal and state

246 (2)97, VwGO

regulations

(a) enacted because of

47 (1) no 1 and (b) other

enacted by states

state enacted

(though not state laws) if the

laws that declare it possible

legal action, VwGO
Important

§

courts - VGH,OVG _

§

to take this

47 (1) No 2.98

is that this judicial review can only be obtained

against regulations

below formal state law.

96 The Federal Constitutional Court is the only Court in
Germany that can declare laws void, see: BVerfGG § 32 (2)
97 BauGB

=

Baugesetzbuch,

code concerned

with building

law

98 the federal government can not order the states to enact
this kind of law dealing with state regulations; there is
not the obligation of the federal or the state governments
deriving from GG art. 19 (4) to give the opportunity to have
this kind of judicial review because even if there would not
be the chance to take legal action against a regulation
there still is the possibility to take legal action against
an act that was enacted because of this regulation, see:
F. Kopp, supra note 64, p.342
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aa) The decision

about compliance

the damage of an individual's

subjective

issued by a higher administrative
bb) There has to be a petition
invalidity

with legislative

law or

rights can only be

court (VGH/OVG).

aiming at the declaration

of

of a certain norm.

cc) Everybody

has the right to file such a petition

he/she received
disadvantage
individuals

or will receive

(VwGO

§

47 (2)) a

because of this regulation.

Not only

if

but also every agency can file a petition

to

control a regulation.
Though it is controversial

what a disadvantage

is meant to be there is unity in the opinions
fact that this must be a legally protected
Some are of the opinion that the possibility
economic

in this sense
concerning

interest.99
that factual or

interests may be damaged are disadvantages

the meaning

of VwGO

§

the

within

47 (2), too.100

dd) There is no pretrial

review and there is no time limit

to sue.

k) provisional

judicial review

In a legal system where the rule of law is the main
principle

and aim there has to be the possibility

to obtain

Judgement of July 14th 1978, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 56,172,175

99

VGH Baden Wuerttemberg, Judgement of February 2nd 1977,
in: 30 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1977, (pt 3), 1212

100
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judicial review prior to the execution
administrative

of an action of an

agency. This is necessary

possibility

that arbitrary

an unwanted

and unjust legal status quo.

Because this provisional

or unjust actions may establish

judicial review has to be well -

timed and fast to be effective
examination101

to avoid the

there only can be a summary

before the court makes a decision.

is "only" provisional

But as this

review to protect a certain status quo

and not a final decision

- even if the provisional

decision

should be wrong it can and will be changed in the court's
final decision.
The main essence about provisional
that it is provisional

review is not the fact

but that it is fast and well _

timed. 102
The provisional
legality"

review reverses the "assumption

of the action of the sovereign

and it remains

of the

into its contrary103

like this until the final decision

is issued.

aa) If a person wants to take legal action against an
administrative

act he/she has to enforce his/her rights with

an Anfechtungsklage
obtain a pretrial

where there is the legal requirement
administrative

review, VwGO

§

68 (1).

101
K.Finkelnburg/K.Jank,
"Vorlaeufiger Rechtsschutz
Verwaltungsstreitverfahren",p.2/3,
3rd ed. 1986

im

"Only well - timed jUdicial review is just jUdicial
review", P. Kirchhof, supra note 12, 453, 464

102

103

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

supra note 49, p.149

to

50

While obtaining

the pretrial

review or while taking legal

action with an Anfechtungsklage
the administrative
decision

§§

80,80a rule that

act can not be executed unless a final

has been made by the court concerning

legality/illegality
The execution

of this administrative

of the administrative

it may be addressed
affected

the VwGO

act.

act is stopped even if

to several persons or if many people are

but only one takes legal action, VwGO

Because the pretrial

of the administrative

to execute the administrative

to the time the act was enacted.
an administrative

§

80a.

review and the Anfechtungsklage

be taken after the enactment
prohibition

the

104

have to
act the

act is retroactive

The agency that executes

act before the time limit to take legal

actions has passed acts at its own risk. 105
This means that if the citizen takes legal actions within
the time limit but after the agency executed the act the
agency has to reverse the execution

of the administrative

act. 106
There are some exceptions
administrative
(VwGO

104

§§

act may not be executed before the time limit

70 (1), 74 (1): 1 month) is over:

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

Judgement of October
BVerwGE 28,63,65
105

106

though from the fact that the

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

supra note 48, p.153
11th 1967, 5th senate,

supra note 49, p. 155
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(1) VwGO

80 (2) No 1: if a pUblic authority

§

the agency may execute the administrative

demands taxes

act ordering

the

citizen to pay the taxes;
(2) VwGO

§

80 (2) No 2: important

pOlice may be executed
(3) VwGO

§

execution
(4) VwGO

immediately;

80 (2) No 3: in oases where the immediate
is ordered by explicit

§

and urgent orders of the

federal law;

80 (2) No 4: in cases where the immediate

execution

is favored by public interests

interests

of one of the participants.

The agency

is legally required to submit a written statement

why an immediate

execution

not submit this statement
execution
reasons

the execution

If the agency does
was illegal. The

act is illegal, too, if the

the agency stated were not based upon important
public interests

bb) The plaintiff

.107

has to apply for provisional

review by the competent
§

is necessary.

of the administrative

"overweighing"

VwGO

or by outweighing

administrative

123. With this provisional

to receive

legal position/advantage.
a provisional

decision

court in the case of

review the plaintiff

the court to force the administrative
a certain

judicial

wants

agency to give him/her
There is the possibility

if there is the danger

that a legal position may be changed

irretrievable

or that

this is very important because otherwise the provisional
review would be enacted in the VwGO but not enforceable,
reliable and effective

107
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the enforcement
difficult,
VwGO

§

of a legal position/right

VwGO 123 (1) sentence

123 (1) sentence

provisional

decision

relationship

would be much more

1.

2 states that there also can be a

if there is a controversial

between

legal

an agency and one (or more) citizen

that may change. When this change would harm one of the
participants
provisional

if the court would not act immediately
judicial decision

should be made.

cc) Even in the Normenkontrollverfahren
administrative

a

the higher

court can make a provisional

decision

if it

should be necessary.
Different

from the other cases where provisional

available

in this case the plaintiff

execution

of a legal norm which affects many people.

Because of this a high standard
interests
decision

is required
concerning

The plaintiff
very important

concerning

way that there are

decision

decision

is the only way to avoid

1.08

review on behalf of

47 (8) only if it is of the opinion that to stop the

execution

1.08

judicial

reasons to receive this provisional

The court will release a provisional

because

the affected

a regulation.

has to state in a plausible

severe disadvantages.

§

tries to end the

to release a provisional

or that this provisional

VwGO

review is

of the regulation

otherwise

has to be required

imperatively

severe damages would occur.

Finkelnburg/Jank,

supra note 101, pp. 156/157
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1) preventive

judicial

The preventive

review

judicial

review

is a necessity

GG art 19 (4): "Legal protection
jUdicial

review

is confronted

GG art 19 (4) "orders"
cases.l.l.0
There
decision

of a court

of this the preventive

jUdicial

review

in some

with other branches
of finding

reviews

GG art 19 (4). Therefore

jUdicial

though that a preventive

judicial

jUdicial

if the

with a fait accompli" .1.09

interferes

they still are in the process

the "standard"

is not efficient

preventive

is the problem

of

review

a decision.

review has to proof a special

Because

should not be one of

made possible

the plaintiff

while

through

of the preventive
legitimation

to use

this legal action. 1.1.1.
The necessity

to have a special

the way that the plaintiff
legal protection.
missing

if it can be expected

"usual"

judicial

"special

that the plaintiff

after the agency

has to be much more

1.10Judgement of July 20th 1962, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 14,323,328
1.1.1.
E.Schmidt-Assmann,

supra note 46, p. 153

1.1.2
Judgement of September
BVerwGE 40,323,326

obtains

acted.1.1.2
The

supra note 46, p. 152

8th 1972, 4th senate,

in

need" for

need for legal protection

need" for legal protection

1.09E. SChmidt-Assmann,

is realized

has to have a "special

This special

review

legitimation

is
the
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intense than the usual "general

need" for legal

protection.u3
aa) with the preventive

Feststellungsklage

the plaintiff

wants the court to forbid the agency to act in a certain
way.U4 This action may be an administrative

act or any other

form the agency chooses to take. As this is preventive
review the agency so far did not act but it is "obvious"
that it will act in a certain way. Not the fact that it is
"obvious"

that the agency will act is the most important

issue concerning

this legal action but to avoid the

possibility

that an irretrievable

established

is the main concern.

situation

may be

It can be "obvious"

that

the agency will act if e.g. the agency acted like this
before

in corresponding

The plaintiff

situations.

has to have a special

in a legal protection
e.g. the irretrievable
or the irretrievable

and qualified

of his rights. Reasons
execution
consolidation

of a certain

the agency would act in the expected

agency

unterlassungsklage

to enact a certain

is almost

114W. Schmitt

or

or if

way.
aims to prohibit

the

act. This lawsuit

Feststellungsklage

later under D) h)
Glaeser,

act

situation

act was enacted

administrative

the same as the preventive

113discussed

for that are

of the administrative

legal status quo if the administrative

bb) The preventive

interest

supra note 49, p. 209

with
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the difference

that the preventive

used against any administrative
preventive

Unterlassungsklage

administrative
Because

can be

agency action whereas the
can be used only against

acts.

of this the preventive

sUbsidiary

Feststellungsklage

to the preventive

dealing with administrative
cc) The third possibility
review is the preventive

Feststellungsklage

Unterlassungsklage

can be
in cases

acts.us
to use the preventive

allgemeine

Leistungs

jUdicial

-

Unterlassungsklage.
This lawsuit serves two purposes:
agency already

(1) when an administrative

acted in an illegal way and the plaintiff

tries to prevent

now

the agency from acting the same way in the

future and (2) when it is certain that the administrative
agency will act and the plaintiff
Important

is the plausible

tries to prevent this.H6

danger of reiterationu7

or

special reasons that justify not to wait for the
administrative

action.H8

Judgement of May 7th 1987, 3rd senate,
BVerwGE 77, 207,211
1.15

this prevential jUdicial review has the same aim as the
preventive Feststellungsklage,
supra aa)
116

Judgement of February
BVerwGE 44, 351

11.7

8th 1974, 7th senate,

Judgement of April 18th 1985, 3rd senate,
BVerwGE 71, 183,188

118
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4) admissibility

of these lawsuits

The requirements

for the recourse

to the courts may differ a

little bit from lawsuit to lawsuit. The requirements
are explained

and described

requirements

§

of the recourse

40 gives recourse

disputes

in this part are the main

that are needed for all lawsuits.

a) admissibility
VwGO

concerning

to a different

law. Plaintiffs
hurt through

to the administrative

correspondence

law and may not be constitutional

often claim that constitutional

action and its

with its legal basis. Constitutional
§

40 are constitutional

government

and the states or the Bundestag

or members

of the executive

"constitutional

recourses

119

concerning

rights and privileges

law in

claims between the
and the executive

disputes

over

of the respective

organ".

of VwGO

legal recourse

rights are

action. Object of the legal

is the administrative

the sense of VwGO

constitutional

is ordered

court by federal law. The dispute has to be a

the administrative

action though

courts in all

public law unless the dispute

matter of administrative

The purpose

that

§

40 is to define the administrative

and to show the difference

(especially

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

to other legal

to the constitutional).u9

supra note 49,

p. 34
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The administrative

court has to examine whether

to the administrative
respective
mainly

.120

with administrative

The plaintiff

otherwise

law it has to dismiss

(respectively

to take care that the competent
because

in the

case. If the court finds that the case is not

concerned

the case

court really is available

the recourse

his/her

lawyer) has

court deals with the lawsuit

the time - limit to sue (VwGO

§

74) might

be over.

b) infringement
In the german
different

of a subjective

right

legal system the law can be divided

into two

kinds of law: one type of law is enacted to rule,

to regulate

society and to establish

order

.121

The other type

of law

gives persons who are addressed

by this certain

statute

legal rights. With this subjecti ve122 public right

the individual

can demand a special action/inaction

administrative

agencies

VwGO

120

§

from the

and from the sovereign

in general.

42 (2) rules that a lawsuit is admitted

only if the

F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 101

these laws are not enacted to protect or favor a certain
interest but e.g. to regulate administrative procedures or
to specify the different traffic signs
121

called this way because this law was enacted to serve
individuals/subjects.
This right is not necessarily given to
everybody but in most cases it protects certain groups, e.g.
students, farmers, tenants; to establish this protection
rights are given to these groups on which they can rely
122
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plaintiff
harmed

states in a plausible

through

way that his/her

the action of the agency.

During the admissibility
prove that his/her

the plaintiff

123

does not have to

rights are harmed but he/she has to state

facts which make this violation

very possible.

124

The court may not examine whether the plaintiff
the claimed
hurt because

rights are

subjective

really has

right or whether this legal right was

these are questions

concerning

the success of

the lawsuit.125

c) pretrial
The pretrial

review, VwGO

§

68 (1)

review is a review of an administrative

the agency that enacted this act. Furthermore
review

is necessary

if a citizen applied

act by

this pretrial

for a certain

to receive e. g. a building permission certain formal
requirements have to be fulfilled. But if these requirements
are fulfilled the person has a legal right to receive the
desired building permission. With fulfilling the
requirements this person is an addressee of the SUbjective
right given in this statute. If the agency nevertheless
rejects to give this building permission his/her subjective
right is violated. This elucidates the fact that a person
can come in the favor of a SUbjective right if certain legal
or factual requirements apply to that person; instructive to
the necessity of the violation of the SUbjective right for
the admissibility: Judgement of June 25th 1969, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 32,222,223
123

124
Judgement of October 29th 1963, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 17, 87,91; this can be a dubious system because
there of course is always the danger that while examlnlng
the plausible possibility of the infringement of the
subjective right the courts decision may be anticipated

125

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

supra note 49, p. 94
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administrative

act but this request was rejected

agency.

The citizen

against

this rejection

court. However,
months
without

then has to obtain a pretrial

waiting

for an agency answer or decision,

review serves many

not settle

themselves

This pretrial

review is necessary

If the plaintiff

was enacted

and the

on the claims that did
review.

and mandatory

before

or a

68 (1).

did not take a pretrial

review

is not necessary

by one of the highest

review before

if the administrative

act

federal or state agencies,

68 (1) No 1, or if a third person

with the agency decision

U6

§

can

legal action the judge has to suspend the trial.126

A pretrial

§

VwGO

75.

agency has the

legal action with an Anfechtungsklage

Verpflichtungsklage,

VwGO

at the agency's

§

a lawyer and

its own actions

courts can concentrate

VwGO

the citizen

review by himself without

to review and control

administrative

taking

purposes:

going to court, the administrative

possibility

taking

legal action before a

may take legal action before a court

obtain the pretrial
without

before taking

review

if the agency did not act within three

the citizen

The pretrial

by the

is incriminated

for the first time127 he/she does

F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 570

if e.g. one person receives an administrative act
against which this person takes a pretrial review; if the
decision of the agency then incriminates a third person this
person is incriminated for the first time
127

60

not have to start a pretrial
action, VwGO
The citizen

§

review before taking legal

68 (1) No 2.

has to take the pretrial

after the administrative
was rejected,

VwGO

§

review within one month

act was enacted or his/her request

68.

The citizen has the right and the duty to obtain this
pretrial
receive

review. He/she furthermore
an agency decision.

has an entitlement

to

The citizen has to obtain this

pretrial

review without

mistakes

of the agency do not matter because with fulfilling

the formal requirements
necessary

any procedural

mistakes

whereas

the citizen did all that is

to receive the legal protection

that is available

wi th this claim. 128
The pretrial

review has to be applied

after the announcement

for within one month

of the administrative

agency that enacted the act, VwGO

§

70 (1) sentence

This time limit will not start running though
did not send legal instructions
VwGO

§

act at the
1.

if the agency

with the administrative

act,

58 (1). If the agency did not send these legal

instructions

this is a failure of the agency129 which may not

burden the citizen

if he/she does not react in the required

F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 562; if procedural mistakes of
the agency could possibly diminish the citizens rights the
whole system would be superfluous
1U

129the "normal" agency is not required by law to send legal
instructions, see: W.Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 118;
only a federal agency has to submit a legal instruction by
law, VwGO § 59
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time.1.3OTherefore
action,

VwGO

the addressee

has one year to take legal

58 (1), if these legal instructions

§

are not

send to him/her.
The pretrial

review has a provisional

that the agency may not execute
the citizen
VwGO

§

is obtaining

effect

in the sense

the administrative

this pretrial

act while

review,

80 (1) .131.

The administrative

agency will remedy the act if it thinks

the act was either

illegal or not suitable,

the agency thinks

the act is correct

original

act. The administrative

received

through

lawsuit,

VwGO

§

VwGO

§

it will not change the

act with the content

it

this decision1.32will be object of the
79 (1) No 1.

A quite controversial

question

is whether

the agency may

enact a flreformatio in peius" .133This possibility
administrative

72. If

agency to release

a reformatio

of an

in peius

1.30there is a reason for the fact that these legal
instructions should be send to the addressee: most of the
citizens will not know how to react in the legally required
and correct way because these procedural requirements can be
very complicated; for relevance of mistakes of the agency
see: W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p.117
131 as explained supra under the possibilities
provisional review
1.32the administrative
agency

of the

act may have been changed

by the

1.33in favor: Judgement of April 22nd 1971, 8th senate,
BVerwGE 38,60,65; lat.: reviewing the action and making
"even worse"

it
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nowadays

is accepted

reformatio

in general. 134The existence

in peius was controversial

VwGO does not mention
every legally

relevant

legal foundation
therefore

§

pretrial

the

it.13s As

administrative

in peius
law with which the

is dealing.136

74

Verpflichtungsklage
action within

a certain

relevant

the

period of time, VwGO

because

these lawsuits

takes the legal
§

68 (1).137

are concerned

with

orders of an agency that have to be obeyed

by the addressee.
against

134see: W.Schmitt

the FFKand

require that the citizen

This is necessary

protection

because

in favor or against

- basis for the reformatio

Only the Anfechtungsklage,

legally

especially

action of an agency has to have a

is the "special"

respective

d) VwGO

anything

of the

Of course the addressee
other burdens

Glaeser,

has to have legal

of the agency,

too, like

supra note 49, p. 126

135what of course does not astonish keeping in mind that
the VwGO is a federal code and the federal legislator does
not have the right to enact rules for the administrative
procedures of the states, GG art. 74 No.4; worth reading the
whole problem and a legally correct and evident solution:
Judgement of November 12th 1976, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 51, 310,313
136see: Judgement of November 12th 1976, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 51,310,314; if the agency made a discretionary
decision it can reverse its decision and make a new one
137F.Kopp,

supra note 63, p. 624
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e.g. the provisional
execution

of the administrative

The addressee
agency.

jUdicial review that makes the
act impossible.

has one month to react against the act of the

During this month the agency may not enforce the

administrative

act.138 If the citizen does not react within

this period of time though, the reliance
administration
remedies

overweighs

legally binding

within

and the citizen will have no

anymore.

other administrative

addressee

in the proper

actions/inactions

like the administrative

usually

are not

act is so the

of these actions does not necessarily

has to react

a certain period of time.1~

The time limit to sue can be one year instead of one month
if the administrative
with the administrative

agency did not send legal instructions
act, VwGO

§ 58

(1).140

138the agency can enforce the administrative act but when a
court declares the act illegal the agency has to reverse the
enforcement
139Persons usually can react whenever they want though they
have to take care (a) to avoid an irretrievable state and
(b) to avoid the situation that they may forfeit a legal
action. This might happen if the citizen does not respond to
an action of the agency and thereby establishes the general
conviction that he/she accepts the action. With this he/she
builds up reliance in his inaction/acceptance
that he/she
lateron may not abuse.
140though it is not legally required to give legal
instructions (except if a federal agency was acting, VwGO
§ 59) it is a necessity of "real life" because most people
will not know how to react, see supra c)
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e) general

need for legal protection

Though the "general
mentioned

need for legal protection"

explicitly

is not

in the VwGO there is no doubt about the

fact that the plaintiff

has to have this need for legal

protection .141.
Because

an explicit

difficulties

statutory

to explicitly

for legal protection
that this necessity

basis is missing

determine

is necessary.

there are

why this general

Most scholars

is a fundamental

requirement

need

believe
to avoid an

abuse of the jUdicial branch.142 The "need for legal
protection"

is mentioned

in VwGO

§§

43, 113 (1), sentence

4

though which means that the plaintiff143 has to state his
need for legal protection.

Regarding

the other lawsuits

there is the belief that unless evident
contrary

there is a general

facts show the

need for legal protection

because

"abuse"

of the jUdicial branch

Usually

there is the common belief that always when the law

gives a right/entitlement

141.
Judgement of October
BVerfGE 61,126,135
142W. Schmitt

Glaeser,

to a person and this person wants

19th 1982, 1st senate,

supra note 49, p. 75

143 in the Verpflichtungsklage
Feststellungsklage
(FFK)
144Judgement of January
BVerwGE 81,164,165

"is the exception".144

and the Fortsetzungs-

17th 1989, 9th senate,
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to protect
accepted

his/her

right/entitlement

he/she has a generally

need for protection.

5)

when are these lawsuits successful?

a)

correct

claimant

and the right defendant

After the formal and procedural
respective

lawsuits have been examined

judge the question
plaintiff

requirements

then is whether

is legally

the question
defendant,

justified.

right/entitlement

and accepted

by the

the claim of the

This part is concerned

if the correct claimant

if the claimant

of the

with

sued the correct

really has the claimed

subjective

and whether this right or entitlement

hurt in an inadmissible

manner through

an action/inaction

is
of

the agency.
(a) The question

whether the plaintiff

is the correct

claimant

is probably

lawsuit.

In this part the judge has to examine

plaintiff

the most interesting

part of the
if the

really has the claimed Subjective

right/entitlement.us

in the admissibility the plaintiff had to assert that
there is the plausible possibility that his/her rights have
been harmed and though this plausible statement will prove
to be true in all probability (because the judge examined
earlier if this statement really is plausible) hiS/her claim
to a certain sUbjective right/entitlement
nevertheless has
to be examined and proved to be true
145

66

The rightful

claimant

is always the person that really has

the stated subjective

right/entitlement

person has the claimed

..1.46 Whether

legal right depends on two things:

(i) if the claimed right can be a subjective
whether

this subjective

jUdge examines

subjective

right addresses

the legal requirements

find out whether

the plaintiff

right and (ii)

the claimant.

the plaintiff

Normenkontrollantrag
he/she fulfills

, VwGO

The

and the facts and will

really has the claimed

right. Though the other requirements

bit different

the

are a little

who takes legal action with a
§

47, is the right claimant

the in the VwGO

§

42 (2) entitled

requirements

which means that he/she has to have had a

disadvantage

because

will experience

of this regulation

judgement

at the declaration

that a certain

of the Feststellungsklage
legal relationship

or does not exist this is not a question

plaintiff
declaratory

concerning

aims
exists

the fact

right exists or does not exist. Rather the

has to have an entitled

interest to receive

judgement.1"

146
except in the Feststellungsklage
Normenkontrollverfahren

147

or that he/she soon

a disadvantage.147

As the declaratory

if a subjective

if

and the

F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 353

148
this entitled interest is already examined
admissibility of the Feststellungsklage

in the

a
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The defendant
relationship
exist.

is the agenoy with which the legal
is claimed to exist or is claimed not to

149

(b) As administrative

law deals with the relationship

between

power and the citizen,

the sovereign

rules that the right defendant
government

VwGO

or the agency that enacted or rejected
act. If a special council of an

administrative

agency acted this council

VwGO

§

if the respective

78 (1)

is the federal or state

administrative

claimant

§

the

is the right

state law rules this,

78 (2) No 2.

b) unlawful

agency action?

The examination
administrative
subjective

whether

the correct claimant

agency shows if the plaintiff

right/legal

entitlement

sued the
really has the

he/she claims to have and

claims to be hurt in through the agency action.
The second question

then is whether

the action of the agency

is lawful or illegal.
The lawsuit of the plaintiff

is successful

if the action of

the agency is illegal and through this his/her
rights are harmed, VwGO

§

113 (1) sentence

subjective

1.

The action of the agency will be divided and examined
parts:

(aa) The first part that will be examined

formal legitimacy

149

of the administrative

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

agency's

supra note 49, p. 201

in two

is the
action.
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To establish

reliance

representing

the sovereign

observe

certain

in the administrative

requirements
corresponding

power the agencies

formal and procedural

act. This is necessary

to establish

applicable

have to

requirements

certain

to everybody

if they

formal

in the same way,

to the rule of law and to control the way the

agency found its decision.
observed

agency

enacting

Formal requirements

an administrative

to be

act are e.g.

- that the agency that acted was the local and factual
competent

agency, VwVfG

§

3;

- that the agency obeyed the necessary
requirements,

VwVfG

37 (2)-(4);

§

- that the agency observes
its actions,

VwVfG

§

procedural

the necessity

to give reasons

39150;

- if a federal agency enacts an administrative
give legal instructions,

VwGO

- that the administrative
addressee,

VwVfG

§§

for

§

act it has to

59;

act is announced

to the correct

41,43.

If the agency complies

with all the required

necessities

the

action of the administrative

agency was enacted

legitimate

this part of the act is legal.

way and therefore

(bb) The second part of the examination
deals with the question

whether

in a formal

is the part that

the action itself was legal

this is legally required at least for the enactment
of an administrative act, see: W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra
note 49, p. 143; if the agency does not act in a legally
relevant way there is not necessarily the duty to give
reasons for the action
150
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or illegal.

First of all there has to be a law that serves

as the "legal foundation"

and basis and which allows the

agency to enact administrative

acts in this topic. An agency

can only enact an administrative

act legally if there is a

law that allows the agency to act in this certain way. This
can either be a law that regulates
for the agency to act concerning
be a special

the general

possibility

a certain topic or it can

law which gives the agency the right to act in

a certain way on a certain occasion.

151

The enacted act of

the agency has to comply with the legal contents

of its

"legal foundation".
Furthermore

general

legal requirements

like e.g. the administrative
regarding
purpose

its content

have to be obeyed

act has to be specific

and the proportionality

and the used methods

has to be weighed

between

aim,

in the

correct way. 152
If the agency used discretion
without

abusing

it has to use this discretion

its power, VwVfG

Finally the administrative

§

40.

act has to be compatible

with

"higher"

law such as federal and state laws and regulations.

Probably

the most important

question

whether

and difficult

the agency weighed

1M

see: F.Kopp,

152

W. Schmitt Glaeser,

task is the

the different

supra note 52, p.506
supra note 49, p. 143

interests
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at stake - those of the individual
administrative

and those of the

agency - in the correct manner.

But if all these requirements
the administrative

are fulfilled

act is legitimate

but also in the objective

and therefore

not only in the formal

part the administrative

act is

lawful.
If the administrative

act is lawful the lawsuit

is without

success.
(cc) If the agency made a mistake
the substantive
the existence

part the administrative
of a subjective

this sUbjective
illegality

administrative

agency

but the agency

earlier
the

the illegal

is not successful.~53

inaction?

wants the agency to act in a certain

rejects

the question

As

act. If the subjective

is not hurt through

act - the lawsuit

If the plaintiff

months

right was examined

of the administrative

unlawful

act is illegal.

right has to be injured through

right of the plaintiff

c)

in either the formal or in

to act or does not act within

the judge has to examine

way
three

is if the

~53The court may declare the administrative act illegal but
nevertheless the lawsuit is not successful if the subjective
rights of the plaintiff are not violated. This is important
for the costs because in Germany the party that looses the
lawsuit pays everything, the opponent's lawyer and the
court's costs. In cases dealing with social welfare and
veteran's benefits the plaintiff does not have to pay the
costs of the court, VwGO § 187
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plaintiff

has a legal entitlement

to demand this desired

action.
The judge therefore
plaintiff
desired

has to examine

if the statement

(that he/she has a legal entitlement

action)

corresponds

dismissed.

of the plaintiff

If the judge finds that it does correspond

court's decision

can be depending

requirements/possibilities
(aa) The examination

subjective

on the legal

of the subjective

action/act.

with

how the

for the administrative

has a legal entitlement

administrative
his/her

does

with the legal facts the lawsuit will be

the legal reality there are two possibilities

plaintiff

to the

with the legal reality.

If the judge finds that the statement
not correspond

of the

action.

right proved that the

to demand a certain

His/her entitlement

respectively

right has been hurt by the inaction of

the agency but it will be violated

furthermore

if the court

will not order the agency to act. The court will find a
decision

called Spruchreife

assumptions

if all legal and factual

which have been claimed by the plaintiff

are

exactly the way he/she claimed them to be. If all these
factual and legal requirements

to enact the desired

administrative

and the agency therefore

no discretion

act are present

the court will order the administrative

has

agency

72

to enact exactly the desired
VwGO

§

113 (5) sentence

(bb) If the examination
entitlement/subjective

administrative

act,

1.154
of the presence

of a legal

right of the plaintiff

he/she has such an entitlement/right

showed that

the court will order

the agency to act. Though the factual and legal necessities
to enact the desired

administrative

"only" a Bescheidungsurteil
discretion,

VwGO

§

Bescheidungsurteil
administrative
the explicit

2. with a

the agency will be ordered to enact an

act but it still has discretion

in choosing

content of the desired administrative

agency. The discretion

Important

its own opinion

a Bescheidungsurteil

act.

for that of the

of the agency may concern

but not the legally required
concerning

- making

means that the agency still has

113 (5) sentence

The court can not substitute

of matters

act are present

all kinds

necessity

to act.155

is the fact that

the agency has to act and has to respect the legal
interpretation

the court found in its decision.

156

w. Schmi tt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 177; a decision
called Spruchreife will only be made if there are no doubts
at all about the factual and legal assumptions because the
court of course may not enforce the agency to make a certain
decision with which the court would substitute its own
decision for that of the agency
154

155

F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 984

156
W.Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 178; "to respect"
does not necessarily mean the same as "to obey" because the
agency still can make a discretionary decision within the
legal boundaries
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As the U.S. legal system is a common law system the degree
or the extent of the judicial review itself may change. ~64
Congress

can either provide the right to obtain

review or it can withdraw

an existing

jUdicial

right to obtain

jUdicial review~65 as long as it does not interfere
consti tutionally

guaranteed

with the

rights. ~66

obtain jUdicial review if a person suffers a "legal wrong"
except for the regulation in APA § 701 (a) which rules that
persons do have the right to obtain jUdicial review "except
to the extent that (1) statutes preclude jUdicial review or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law"; good representation: Cynthia Tripi, "Availability of
Judicial Review of Administrative Action",53 Geo.Wash.Law
Rev. 729,730, (1987)
~64as was demonstrated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 s.ct. 2778,
81 L.Ed. 2d 694, (1984); as well as the law itself may
change: "Ratio est legis anima; mutata legis rations mutatur
et lex", "The reason for the law is its soul; when the
reason for the law changes, the law changes as well", see:
A.Scalia, supra note 160, p. 515
~65Art III of the U. S. Constitution; a case where the
Supreme Court upheld a statute of Congress that withdrew
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even after the
case has been orally argued before the Supreme Court: Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868)
~66Winfried Brugger, "Einfuehrung in das Oeffentliche Recht
der U.S.A.", pp. 185-188,(1993); with Goldberg v. Kelly
{397 U.S. 254, 90 S. ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)} the
Supreme Court accepted the possibility to protect
entitlements or "privileges" whereas before this decision
there was a clear distinction between "rights" and
"privileges" and the possibility to obtain judicial review
to protect the "due process of law- requirements"; since the
decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
{408 U.S. 564, 92 S.ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)} the
Supreme Court attached importance to the question of the
individual affection and the interpretation of the meaning
of "life, liberty and property"
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APA § 703 rules that if a "special statutory
proceeding
Congress

relevant

the plaintiff

court mentioned
review"
APA

§

to the subject matter"

in the statute.

703. If no explicit

action"

was created by

has to bring his/her

lawsuit

review" enlisted

court was mentioned

may take "any applicable

in a "court of competent

in the

Besides this "statutory

there also is a "non - statutory

the plaintiff

review

in

in the statute

form of legal

jurisdiction"

.167

If there are no special rules that mention which court is
the competent

one the general

to be contacted,
The statutes
to obtain

rules for federal courts have

like e.g. 28 U. S.C .A.

jUdicial review but they do not give jurisdiction

b) presumption

out whether

Congress

in 1946 the courts had to find

intended

review the administrative
and legislative

W.Brugger,

.169

of reviewability

Before the APA was enacted

1n

1331.168

of the APA do apply if there is the possibility

to a special court or federal courts

purpose

§

to authorize

action. Language,

the courts to
structure,

history of the respective

statute

supra note 166, p. 204

168
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or
treatise of the U.S.", 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.ct. 980,
51 L.Ed. 2d 192, (1977)

1~
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served as means to help the courts in evaluating
intent.

Congress'

170

After the APA was enacted
find out whether
or whether

it became easier for courts to

they could review an administrative

they could not. Two sections

favor a "presumption

of review".

APA

§

action

of the APA evidently
703 rules that:

"Except to the extent that prior, adequate,

and exclusive

opportunity

by law, agency

action

for judicial review is provided

is subject to review in civil or criminal

for jUdicial

enforcement".

action made reviewable

APA

review".

reviewability"

704 says that "Agency

by statute and final agency action

for which there is no adequate
to jUdicial

§

remedy in a court are subject

This statutory

"presumption

was favored and strengthened

decision

in Abbott Laboratories

decision

the Supreme Court - researching

legislative

history172

reviewability":
be given a

-

confirmed

of

by the Court's

v. Gardner.171

In this

the APA's

this "presumption

"[The APA's] generous

hospitable

proceedings

of

review provisions

must

interpretation ..•. [and] only upon a

showing of clear and convincing

evidence

of a contrary

170
see: C. Tripi, supra note 163, 729,731; a good
historical overview over the administrative process and the
APA: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24, pp. 27-33

171

387 U,S. 136, 87 S.ct 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d

172

see: C.Tripi,

supra note 163, 729,731

681, (1967)
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legislative
jUdicial
APA

§

intent should the courts restrict

access to

reviewll•173

701 (a) is an exception

to the IIpresumption of

reviewabilityll and it rules that "[T]his chapter
according

to the provisions

thereof,

except to the extent

that - (1) statutes

preclude

action

to agency discretion

is committed

In its decision

in citizens

v. Volpe174 the Supreme

judicial review;

to Preserve

Overton

Court found and decided

reviewability

exception"175 that applies
statutes

or (2) agency

by lawll.

IIcommitted to agency discretionll exception
(2) of the general

applies,

Park, Inc.
that the

of APA

§

701 (a)

is a "very narrow

only "in those instances

where

are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case

there is no law to apply" .176
Even though

a decision

may be "committed

discretion"

it nevertheless

may be reviewable.

In Doe v. Casey177 the D.C. Circuit
congressional

intent to preclude

by clear and convincing

to agency

evidence;

held that "(1)

review must be established
(2) that the existence

173 387 U. S • 136, 141
174401 U.S. 402, 91 S.ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d

136 (1971)

1m 401 U.S. 402, 410
U6 401 U.S. 402, 410
177 796 F 2d 1508, 254 U.S. App. D.C. 282 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

of
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statutory

standards

is evidence

of intent not to preclude

review; and (3) that the structure

of the statutory

scheme

may support a finding of congressional

intent to preclude

review only if the scheme is extremely

complex or delicately

balanced" .178
Though of course there have been changes
the statutory

interpretation

of reviewability".1~
"unreviewability"
reviewability"

in the law and in

there still is the "presumption

Cases dealing with reviewability

do not oppose this "presumption

but as there are statutes

without

or

of
a very

clear congressional

intent180 these cases help to develop and

to apply a standard

on how to "review" without

regulations

of Congress.

c) presumption
APA

§

of unreviewability

701 (a) (1) (2) regulates

"presumption

of reviewability".

"to the extent"

178 C.Tripi,
1515 - 1516

~9

explicit

of APA

§

the exceptions

to the

Very important

are the words

701 (a).

supra note 163, p.740; 796 F 2d 1508, 1514,

see especially

P.Strauss,

supra note 10, p. 221

180Justice Scalia believes that in the"
cases •..• Congress neither (1) intended
nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon
rather (3) didn't think about the matter
note 160, p. 517

•••vast majority of
a single result,
the agency, but
at all", see supra

80

The meaning

and the extent of the preclusion

been controversial

and object of many Supreme

decisions .181This is a difficult
important

for the respective

not always
problem

expressed

problem

addressee.

by law have
Court

and it is very
Congress'

very clear in the statutes.

for the courts therefore

to what extent Congress

intended

intent is
Main

is to find out whether
to preclude

and

judicial

review182 and to find the amount of discretionary

power the

agency was authorized

being

to use by Congress

jUdicial

reviewable.1~

Figuring

out to what extent Congress

judicial

review

intention
review

the Supreme

but nevertheless

constitutional

without

intended

Court followed
often upheld

to preclude

congressional

its authority

to

questions. 184

181a thorough analysis and discussion of "unreviewability":
Ronald M. Levin, "Understanding Unreviewability
in
Administrative
Law", in: 74 Minnesota Law Review 689, (1990)
182AP A

§

701 (a ) (1 )

183AP A

§

701 (a ) (2 )

184 "To avoid a constitutional confrontation, the Court
assumes that Congress did not intend a preclusion of review
provision to deny the Court the power of constitutional
review", Paul R. Verkuil, "Congressional Limitation on
Judicial Review of Rules", 57 Tulane L.Rev. 733, 737,
(1983); see also the distinction between "constitutional
review" and "statutory review" explained and presented by
Paul Verkuil, ide ad 746-750
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Even though
judicial
courts

in some cases Congress

review

entirely

nonetheless

still can review constitutional
though

the borders

may not be very clear.
whether

excluded

it is quite easy to understand

It can be very difficult
review because

explicitly

if Congress

that

issues.

limits

jUdicial

or the amount of this limitation

If Congress

did not clearly

state

there should be limits of judicial review and which

limits there should be the courts mostly assume that
Congress

did intend to provide

jUdicial

review

Problematic
whether

the possibility

to obtain

for the addressee.1.8S

for the courts though can be the question

the action of the agency was within the limits of

its congressionally
discretion

delegated

is reviewable

The decision

in Citizens

or whether
to Preserve

stated that the "committed
of reviewability

discretion

Overton

Park v. Volpe186

to agency discretion"

(2) is a "very narrow exception"

exception

in APA § 701 (a)

that precludes

where statutes

this

it is not.

of agency action enacted

those rare instances

and whether

review

"in

are drawn in such broad

terms that in a given case there is no law to apply" .187

18Ssee: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 124

1.86401 U.S. 402, 91 S.ct. 814, 28 L.Ed. 2d 136 (1971)
187 401 U. S. 402, 410

82

The decision
analyzing
because
APA

§

was the "starting

point"l.88of the Supreme

the reviewability

of discretionary

it was a very narrow

interpretation

701 (a) (2) - but nevertheless

confirmation
decision

of the "presumption

therefore

influence

decision

of

contained

Administration
The Supreme

a

of reviewability"

- this

"almost any agency action" .189
of the Supreme

Court with weighty

on the "unreviewabili ty" was Heckler

This case concerned

the refusal

v. Chaney. 190

of the Food and Drug

(FDA) to take a certain

Court refused

demanded

action .191

to order the FDA to perform

demanded

action.

In its decision

agency's

refusal

to take action under its substantive

statute

was presumptively

Supreme

Court broadened

In the Heckler

and

can be seen as to grant courts the

possibili ty to review
A more recent

actions

Court

the

the Court found that an

unreviewable192 and with that the
the meaning

v. Chaney decision

of APA

§

701 (a) (2).

the Supreme Court did not

intend to remove the "no law to apply" - doctrine

188PiercejShapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p.125

189PiercejShapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24., p. 125

"0 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1985)
191as the definition of "agency action" includes the
"failure to act", APA § 551 (13), courts generally may
review inaction of agencies
192 470 U.S. 821,831

83

established in the Overton Park - decision but more than
that stated that "review is not to be had if the statute is
drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion" .

193

So whenever the substantive statute at issue reveals a
congressional intent to preclude review, whenever there is
"no law to apply" or whenever the agency used its
discretionary power there is no jUdicial review available.

d) committed to agency discretion?
A problem closely related to the reviewability or
"unreviewability" of agency action is the question whether
an action was "committed to agency discretion"

194

and whether

- or: to what extent - a court can control decisions where
an agency used discretionary power.
There of course are discretionary actions which are not
reviewable at all because they have no legal impact. If
there is no legal impact in most cases there is no necessity
for the citizen to take any legal action. If the use of the
discretionary power has a legal impact it is necessary to
know if there are legal actions which can be used to control
the discretionary action.

193

470

U. S • 821, 830

194

APA § 701

(a) ( 2 )

84

If an agency used its congressionally
make a discretionary
its opinion

decision

to

the court can not substitute

Congress

wanted to delegate

is not stated explicitly

which regulate
problems

authority

for the one of the agency. Quite often the

amount of discretion
agency

delegated

to the

and as there are no rules

how to use the discretion

- there may arise

about how to control which actions.

Source of discretion

used by an agency can be either the

Consti tution or a statute.
Constitution

is especially

the source of discretion197
are statutes

195

Discretion

provided

by the

used by the executive.196
used by administrative

enacted by Congress

to delegate

Usually
agencies

power to the

agencies.
If Congress
explicit

delegated

standards

discretionary

power it can either give

on how to use this discretion

or it can

see: Peter Shane, "Federal Policy Making by Consent
Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion",
U.Chi.Legal F. 241, p.7, (1987)
195

1987

though the administrative agencies are part of the
executive the addressee of this kind of discretionary power
more likely is the President than an administrative agency
196

some people divide discretion into different categories
in which discretion can be used; see: Charles Koch,
"Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion", 54 Geo.
Wash. L.Rev.469, 470 ,(1986); surely discretion can be
categorized but the question is whether this really is
necessary and whether this is useful because discretion is
treated as discretion by courts and not as discretion #1
or discretion #3
197

85

delegate

this power without

explicit

standard

difficulties
wanted

standards. 198If there is no

given by Congress

a court may have

finding out exactly to what extent Congress

to delegate

Courts generally

discretionary

power to the agency.

permit agencies

a lot of discretion

concerning

the interpretation

of statutes,

procedures

and in all aspects

of decision

finding.u9

Courts usually

to agency discretion".

agency discretion

to apply".
decision

of reviewability"
This guideline

the statute

Though courts defer to

by proving

established

in the correct

198 see PiercejShapirojVerkuil,
199PiercejShapirojVerkuil,

whether
the

that there is "law

with the Overton

for the courts because

of the Supreme

if

topic has been

"law to apply" the court can find out whether

Park - decision

decision

its rights and they can overcome

is very helpful

interpreted

and fact

they of course always can examine

the agency exceeded
"presumption

making

defer to the agencies

they are "convinced"20o that the respective
"committed

to choose

Park

if there is

the agency

way. 201The Overton

Court was very important

for

supra note 24. p.40

supra note 24, P .116

P. Strauss, supra note 10, p.221; in cases of "high
uncertainty, courts are likely to read congressional
limitations into the statute", Martin Shapiro,
"Administrative
Discretion: The Next Stage", 92 Yale L.J.
1487, 1508, (1983)

~O

201see supra, Citizens
401 U.S. 402

to Preserve

Overton

Park v. Volpe,

86

the development

of the reviewability

action.202 This decision
reviewability"
is within

of administrative

strengthened

the "presumption

by finding out when a decision

its delegated

can be reviewed

discretionary

Chaney203 stated that an administrative

from judicial

agency's

decision

presumptively

are presumptively

unreviewable

actions

that are

rules stated in the APA the Supreme Court's

in Vermont

a certain

immune

by a court.204

As to procedural
decision

not

there are

the agency can make finding its decision

reviewable

maximum

in Heckler v.

review. But even though discretionary

of the agencies
mistakes

of the agency

power and therefore

by the courts. The decision

to take action should be considered

of

Yankee2~ made clear that the APA enacts

amount/number

of procedural

of procedural
rules reviewable

rules which is the
by the courts.

agency wants to grant more and additional

procedural

If an
rules

it is free to do so. A court can not force an agency to
grant more procedural

rights or rules than those granted by

202P. Strauss calls this decision
review", supra note 10, p. 261

the "Baedeker

of jUdicial

203 470 U.S. 821; this decision was very important as it
invented a "new standard" of jUdicial review, see later
pp. 89 - 91

~4

see: M.Shapiro,

supra note 200, p.1490

205Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc, 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.
2d 460 (1978)

87

the APA though because
Evidently

a court can review the agency decision

agency made a decision
authority"

whether

is reviewable

the second question
judicial

review

mentioned

and "occurs pursuant

the agency's
provisions

under

decisions

of a particular

mentioned

above under

206

APA

§

of the APA.2Q7 The
"statutory

designating

208

(b) is called

whenever

action was made

review authority

agency".

to

down in the respective

(a) is called

to a statute

is solved

the possibility

is (a) written

court or courts to exercise

and "is available

it is unreviewable

then is whether

by the general

possibility

the action of the administrative

or whether

or (b) whether

reviewable

.2Q6

review

After the question

statute

rights"

review of which actions?

a) statutory

obtain

if the

"in excess of statutory

or "short of statutory

2) judicial

agency

courts are not "free to impose them".

review"

a particular
over described

The second possibility
"non-statutory

the party seeking

review"

review can

706 (2)( c)

APA § 701 (a): judicial review is provided except "to
the extent that (1) statutes preclude review; or (2) the
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law"
207

208

p.strauss,

supra note 10, p.212

88

frame a complaint
invoking
Usually

that meets the general

the jurisdiction
the organic

the actions
reviewable

of the courts.

act that creates

requirements

for

a09

an agency provides

of the agency based on an evidential

that

record are

by a court, mostly by a court of appeals. 2~O

If there is a statute

providing

jUdicial review

in most

cases this respective

statute will govern the time, venue

and form of review.au

The statute which served as an example

and was copied many times was the Federal Trade Commissions
Act •2~2
APA

§

702 rules that the United states shall be "an

indispensable
The Abbott

party" except

Laboratories

for suits for money damages.

v. Gardner2~3 decision

there should be doubts whether
the possibility

m9

P.Strauss,

to obtain

Congress

judicial

showed that if

intended

to provide

review the courts presume

supra note 10, p. 212

2~OK. C. Davis, supra note 21, vol. 4, p. 131;
sometimes district courts are the right courts to obtain
statutory review, DaVis, ide ad p. 133; to keep in
mind though is the fact that appellate jurisdiction of
federal appellate courts always and only is statutory
review, p.strauss, supra note 10, p.212
au

P.Strauss,

supra note 10, p.212

2~2enacted 1914; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c): "Any person,
partnership or corporation required by an order of the
commission ••... may obtain a review of such order in the
court of appeals of the United states .••"
213 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed. 2d 681, (1967)

89

that congressional intent was in favor of providing judicial
review.

214

b) non - statutory review
As mentioned above there either can be a statutory guarantee
of the possibility to obtain jUdicial review or the general
rules of the APA (with the "presumption of reviewability")
provide the possibility to obtain jUdicial review. APA

§

703

rules that "[I]n the absence or inadequacy" of statutory
review provisions "any applicable form of legal action,
including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of
prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus" can be
taken "in a court of competent jurisdiction". Therefore
there is the possibility to obtain jUdicial review even if
this is not explicitly mentioned in the respective statute
as long as the statute does not preclude review or the
action was "committed to agency discretion by law".

215

387 U.S. 136,141; of course this can help to distinct
between "statutory" and "non-statutory" review but usually
this should not be a question of whether there is "statutory
review" or "non-statutory review" but instead of that it is
useful and helpful to find out whether there is the
possibility to obtain jUdicial review at all or whether this
possibility does not exist
D4

215

APA

§

701 (a)(2)

90

c) administrative action - inaction
Some scholars/lawyers are convinced that there is the
general reluctance to review administrative inaction

216

but

as the definition of "agency action" includes the failure to
217

act

courts sometimes may review agency inactions.

218

The

review of agency inaction therefore is possible even though
it is not possible to the same extent as the review of
action is.

219

As with every lawsuit against an action a

lawsuit against an inaction has to fulfill certain
requirements. These requirements are (a) that the plaintiff
has to have suffered a "legal wrong" through the inaction,

see: Paul Lehner, "Judicial Review of Administrative
Inaction", 83 Col.L.Rev. 627 (1983); the reasons Lehner
gives though are more than questionable: separation of
powers, lack of constitutional authority to intervene or the
fact that nonimplementation suits are not like common law
suits, ide ad 631-633; especially dubious are his reasons in
favor of a judicial review of agency inaction: "The general
inability of the other branches to control agency action
••• is particularly evident in the nonimplementation
context", id.ad 638/639; this should not be a question about
which branch has the most influence or power to control
agency action; but besides this Congress or the executive
could control agency inaction very easy through enacting
certain rules limiting and directing the discretionary
choice of the agency
216

217

APA

§

551 (13)

as used in this thesis "inaction" means the refusal of
an administrative agency to act in a certain way demanded or
requested by a citizen
218

this is necessary as "Discretionary power not to enforce
is the power to discriminate" K.C.Davis, Supra note 21,
Vol.2, p. 218
219

91

(b) the agency action may not be totally
agency discretion

"committed

to

by law" and (c) the inaction must be a

"f inal" agency action.
One of the problems

220

for the courts often is to find out

whether

the refusal to act is a "final" agency decision

whether

the agency is still thinking

Generally

courts are allowed to control whether

failure to take the requested
capricious222
decision

was within the statutory

enforcement

decision

concerning

221.

the agency's

action was arbitrary

after the courts found whether

An important

problem

about the request.

or

and

the agency's

boundaries.
the reviewability

of an action was Dunlop v. Bachowski.

of non223

The

in this case was whether the rule of the Labor-

Management

Reporting

and Disclosure

(b), which held that the Secretary
investigate

complaints

and "shall

Act, 29 u.s.c.

§

482

of Labor "shall"
.•• bring a civil action"

Lehner, supra note 216, p. 646; see: Raymond Murphy,
"The Scope of Review of Agencies' Refusal to Enforce or
Promulgate Rules", 53 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 86,87, (1984)
220

221.

see: R.Murphy,

supra note 220, pp. 88,89

222
"Calculation of the arbitrary and capricious standard
along a sliding scale of deference is appropriate only where
the agency has some discretion", Lehner, supra note 216,
p.665; a question is whether Lehner wants the "arbitrary and
capricious standard" to be on a sliding scale, too,
(diminishing or broadening the extent of the standard) which
would be arbitrary and capricious itself

2n

421 U.S. 560, 95 S.ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed. 2d 377 (1975)

92

was jUdicial
Secretary's

reviewable.
decision

arbitrariness.

meant to prohibit

and the complaining

Though

supporting

or not the reasons

evidence

for

had

that

all jUdicial review of his
therefore

witnesses

"must provide

the court

with copies of a statement

of

his determination". 225

the Secretary

nevertheless

that the Secretary

"clear and convincing

decision".224 The Secretary

reasons

Court held that the

not to take action was reviewable

The Court reasoned

failed to provide
Congress

The Supreme

has discretion

whether

for this decision

make it possible

he wants to act

he has to provide

to control

whether

he acted

arbitrary.

d) discretionary
As mentioned

actions

above226 it can be very difficult

to find out whether
discretionary

intended

to delegate

power to the agencies.

Until the decision
general

Congress

for the courts

"presumption

in Heckler v. Chaney227 there has been the
of unreviewability"

of discretionary

224 421 U. s. 567
n5 421 U.S. 571, APA § 555 (e) rules that "[E]xcept in
affirming a prior denial or when the denial is
selfexplanatory,
the notice shall be accompanied by a brief
statement of the grounds for denial"
226 see: PART III, A) c)/d)
227 470 U. S. 821
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agency actions.
discretionary
decision

First step to establish

to review

actions of agencies was the Supreme Court's

in Citizens

this decision
is precluded

a standard

to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe.228

In

the Supreme Court stated that judicial review
only "in those rare instances

where statutes

are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is
no law to apply".

229

More than just to control whether

agency acted "arbitrary
discretion"230
standard

and capricious"

with this decision

to examine whether

discretionary
boundaries.

decision

discretionary

or with "an abuse of

the courts were given a

the reasons that led to the

were within the statutory's

After the Overton Park decision

Chaney decision

defined the established

the Heckler

standard

agency actions even more explicitly.
an agencies

The

in this case was whether

decision

not to take action was jUdicial reviewable.
Court found that a decision

presumptively
reasoned

committed

that because

v.

to review

question

Supreme

the

discretionary
The

not to take action is

to agency discretion.

The Court

the agency had to balance

several

factors which were within the area in which the agency had
special

expertise

discretionary

228

401 U. S.

229

401

230

AP A

U.S.

§

this decision

decision.

402

402,410

706 (2) (A)

therefore

was a

Heckler v. Chaney established

a "two

94

step" standard:
certain

(a) the first question

"manageable

is whether

standards"231 by which the agency's

action may be judged. The answer to this question
found wi thin the respective
important

concerning

statute's

this first question

is to keep in mind

jUdicial

review this is only a presumption

rebutted

if the respective

statute

for the agency.233 Consulting

the discretion

(b) The second

step tries to distinguish

"reviewabili ty" from balancing

"pragmatic

was inappropriate

reviewability. With this "Chevron
courts were given concrete

231

the question

actions

of the scope of

to determinations

- standard

measures

of review"

how to review

of an agency.

105 S.ct. 1655

2~ R. Levin,

supra note 181, 689,713,714

233what leads to the question
apply"

whether

there is "law to

234 Sharon Werner, "The Impact of Heckler v. Chaney on
Judicial Review of Agency Decisions", 86 Colum. L.Rev.
1247,1256

(1986)

of

considerations". 234

found that this was a question

and therefore

discretionary

these "guidelines"

was abused or used in an arbitrary

way.

review

certain

action and control

and capricious

The Justices

immune from

which can be

provided

the court can review the discretionary
whether

can be

language. 232Very

that even when an agency action may be presumed

guidelines

there are

of
the

95

e) rulemaking

and adjudication

(aa) Agencies

generally

rulemaking.235

If an agency enacts rules it does so to

develop

policy standards

act through

adjudication

and rules for future applications.

To serve this purpose rules are abstract
one individual
standards

but as they establish

they affect many people.

power and influence

236

and affect not only

general and abstract
As rules have a great

many people rulemaking

often is called

"quasi - legislative".

237

influence

act of the respective

the organic

say whether
not.238

rulemaking
allowed

As rules may have an enormous
agency has to

the agency may enact rules or whether

Some agencies

to use this "instrument"

(ii) informal

kinds of rules:

other agencies

to achieve.

may not be

at all. The APA provides
(i) formal rules,

rules, and (iii) interpretative

three kinds of rules differ in their specific
requirements

it may

may be allowed to use the power of

quite often whereas

three different

or through

rules. These
procedural

and in the aim they are used to or will be used
These procedural

requirements

are the main

235
to the distinction between rules and adjudication, see:
William Andreen, "Exercise of Administrative Power and
JUdicial Review", 50 Ala.Law 322,323, (1989)

236

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 292

2n

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 184

238

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p.293
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guidelines

for the jUdicial review as the contents

rules very often may be within the discretionary
the agencies.

Usually

the agencies

of these

power of

are free to choose in

which of those ways they want to act unless the organic act
of the respective
certain
APA

§

agency orders the agency to act in a

way. The definition

the APA rules that the informal procedures

apply to all substantive
statute

rules unless a rule is "required

to be made on the record after opportunity

agency hearing",
suggests

5 U.S.C.

239

that are necessary

There are three procedural
for a formal rule:

553 (b) rules that there has to be a notice240

in the Federal Register";
must hold an evidentiary
parties
evidence

the possibility

(ii) APA

§

to present oral and documentary

must base its conclusions

Andreen,

"published

556 says that an agency

witnesses;

(iii) APA

(e), 557 order that at the end of the hearings

w.

(i) APA

hearing to give the participating

and to crossexamine

record produced

for an

involves broad and complicated

of agency policy.

requirements

by

553 (c). As the name already

§

formal rulemaking

guidelines

239

in

553.

(1) In general

§

of a rule is enacted

and findings

§§

556

the agency

just on the evident

during the course of the proceeding.

supra note 235, 322,324

this notice has to contain time, nature and place of the
proceeding as well as the legal authority

240

97

The most difficult
whether

Congress

informal
hearing

task for reviewing

is the question

wanted the agency to make a formal or an

rule. Usually

the statute must not only order a

but must also contain

some "equivalent

courts

the phrase

"on the record"

verbalization"241 that clearly

states the

congressional

intent to require

congressional

intent is not always very clear the Supreme

Court established
kind of agency
begins

a questioning

a formal rulemaking.

procedure

action was "at stake"242: the examination

action was rulemaking

rulemaking,

the next question

of the respective
the record"

or adjudication.
is whether

agency mentions

or an equivalent.

whether

the organic

statute

the "magic words"243 "on

If it does it has to be a
for an

rule have to be fulfilled.

(2) Though

the name might indicate

rules are substantive
of course

the

If it is

formal rule and if it does not the requirements
informal

Because

to find out what

at the lowest level with the question

agency's

or

private

law, binding

differently
on courts,

- informal
agencies

and

parties. 244

241Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p.294

242United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.,
410 U.S. 224, 241, 93 S.ct. 810, 35 L.Ed. 2d 223, (1973)
243Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 294

U4 united States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695, 94 S.Ct.
3090, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974)
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Enacting

an informal rule the agency is required

three procedural

necessities:

a notice of the proposed
APA

§

553 (b)i

rUlemaking

submission

(i) the agency has to publish

rUlemaking

in the Federal Register,

(ii) after publishing

their intention

the agency has to give interested

opportunity

to participate
of written

in the rulemaking

(c) (the agency may give the opportunity

of

persons an
through

data, views or arguments,

but it is not required

to fulfill

APA

§

553

for an oral hearing

to do so); (iii) the agency then has

to publish

both the final rule and a "concise and general

statement"

of the rule's basis and purpose,

APA

§

553 (c).

The agency - though it is not required

- may provide more

procedural

for interested

persons,

participation

such as two rounds of notice or additional

hearings.24s
Vermont

possibilities

oral

As the Supreme Court stated very clear though

Yankee246

those required

courts may not impose procedures
by the APA. Very important

review are the statements

of the agencies

in

other than

for judicial
accompanying

the

final rule about the basis and purpose of the final rule
because

this is the principal

the substance

of the rule.

(3) The third possibility
the interpretative

2G

P.Strauss,

246

453

U. S .

basis for jUdicial review of

for an agency to enact a rule is

rule which is defined

supra note 10, p.156
1030 (1973)

as to "interpret

or

99

clarify

the nature of the duties previously

passage

of a statute or promulgation

rule"

of a legislative

Quite often the agency has the choice whether

.247

enacts an interpretative
rule. The decision
important

rule or a legislative

only concerning

fulfilled

the procedural

requirements

Usually no procedures

that

have to be
rule unless

statute or the organic act of the respective

agency requires

certain procedures.248

an interpretative

Although

the nature of

rule implies that the rule states an

or the usual procedural

respective

(informal)

if an agency enacts an interpretative

a specific

it

in favor of one of the rules often is

have to be obtained.

opinion

created by

requirements

agency they nevertheless

of the

may have great impact on

people dealing with the agency. This impact will even be
manifested

and strengthened

interpretative
achieves

rule because with this publication

a "formal status that may entitle

deference"
dealing

if the agency publishes

.249

There have been two important

and clarifying

interpretative

the

the rule

it to
decisions

the nature and status of

rules. The first case, Joseph v. United

247

PiercejShapirojVerkuil,

supra note 24, p. 285

~8

p.strauss,

supra note 10, p. 157

2~

p.strauss,

supra note 10, p.158
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states civil Service Commission250,
which the Commission
rule and therefore

thought

to act by legislative
intended

rulemaking
invalid.

provision

The D.C. Circuit argued
authorized

the Commission

rule and (ii) that more than that the

the rule to have the full force of law

which an interpretative
this the Commission

it would be an interpretative

not reviewable.

that (i) the statutory

Commission

dealt with a rule of

rule can not establish.

was required

procedures

Because of

to follow the APA

and as it did not the rule was

General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus251

rule enacted by the Environmental

Protection

dealt with a
Agency

(E.P.A.)

which the agency itself thought to be an interpretative
rule. Nevertheless
a certain

way so that G.M. argued that if it had to follow

the agency's
a legislative
required

the E.P.A. tried to order G.M. to act in

order based on this rule the rule then would be
rule and because the procedural

for a legislative

necessities

rule have not been obeyed when

the rule was enacted this rule would be invalid. The D.C.
Circuit

found that the rule was an interpretative

therefore

rule and

the rule could not have the force of law the

agency wanted

it to have. Besides the interpretative

rule

250

554 F. 2d 1140, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 281 (D.C.Cir.

1977)

2M

724 F.2d 979, 253 U.S. App. D.C. 95, (D.C. Cir. 1983)
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there is another exempt from the APA rulemaking
requirements,

the general

(bb) The distinction

between

procedural

this distinction.

rulemaking

rulemaking.

requirements
Furthermore

should be affected

only a small number of persons

Nevertheless

and many people by

the agency itself may act with one
although

it wants to have the

of one of the other possibilities

could have acted. This was demonstrated
cases.

and adjudication

that can be of help to make

by adjudications

type of these possibilities
benefits

of policy.252

can be quite difficult.253 Usually there are

sometimes
certain

statements

In Londoner

in two Supreme Court

v. City & Council of Denver254 the agency

enacted

a quasi - legislative

people.

Because

it affected

notice and an opportunity
a request

with which it

rule which affected

only a few

only few people the agency gave

to comment only in a written

form,

for an oral hearing was denied by the agency.255

252to the distinction between rules and general statements
of policy: Pacific Gas & Electronic Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 506 F.2d 33, 164 U.S. App.D.C. 371 (D.C.Cir
1974); see also: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24,
pp. 287 - 289
253 for a general and helpful distinction:
note 21, vol.2, pp. 307 - 311

K.C.Davis,

254 210 U.S. 373, 28 S.ct. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103 (1908)
~5 210 U.S. 373, 385 - 386

supra

102
The Supreme Court held that this refusal violated
process

the due

of law - clause because not quasi - legislative

adjudicative

procedures

people the opportunity

were required

Board of Equalization257
city of Denver

to give the affected

of an oral presentation.

The other case was Bi - Metallic

increased

but

Investment

which concerned

256

Co. v. state

a case where the

the value of all taxable property

in Denver by 40 %. Here again the agency did not offer the
possibility

to obtain an oral hearing.

The Court held that

this case did not require an oral hearing
Denver decision

did because

of people were affected
affected

a general

in Londoner

whereas

as the Londoner

only a small number

the Bi - Metallic

number of persons

character

and therefore

case

in the same way. The

Court argued that this was a policy oriented
"legislative"

v.

rule that had a

no oral presentation

was required.
To distinguish

between rulemaking

not only an examination

and adjudication

of the procedural

have been used by the agency are helpful
also the number of people affected
the "action"

are important,

requirements

that

and necessary

but

as well as the purpose of

especially

whether

"new norms of

W.Andreen, supra note 235, 322,323;
Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24, pp.229 - 236

256

257

239

U.S. 441, 36 S.ct. 141,60

though

L.Ed. 372 (1915)

103
conduct"258 shall be established.

adjudication259 where the agency usually

may make law through

would have time to formulate
laws "the choice made between
by individual,

(cc) Adjudication

negative,

§

proceeding

discretion

adjudication.

Usually

it will act through

in form, of an agency

are concerned.

licensing",

There are

the agency is free to decide whether

formal or informal

adjudication

required

on the record after opportunity

hearing".261 So only when Congress

2~ P.Strauss,

affirmative,

the formal and the informal

is a "case of adjudication

determined

for the

are used to decide and solve

cases where only few individuals

there

whether

other than rule making but including

551 (6,7). Adjudications

rule or

agency". 260

as the "agency process

or declaratory

two types of adjudication,

enacting

by general

of the administrative

is defined

injunctive,

through

is one that lies primarily

of" any "final disposition,

in a matter
APA

new standards

ad hoc litigation

in the informed

formulation

And even though an agency

directed

unless

by statute to be
for an agency
the agency to act

supra note 10, p.179

259see: K.C.Davis, supra note 21, vol.2, pp.118,110; Davis
argues that "Since courts may make rules by adjudication,
agencies may", id.ad p.119
260 S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 - 203,
67 s.ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)
261AP A

§

554 (a )

104
through

formal adjudication

the agency is required

to do

so •262
(1) If an agency

acts through

persons

must be given notice of a hearing.

notice

affected

of the hearing

formal adjudication

has to include

matters

is to be held"264 as well as "the

Administrati ve Law Judge266 presides
APA

After the nearing
contains

and conclusions,

on all the material

discretion

presented

will be issued which

and the reasons

or basis

issues of fact, law or

on the record",

this initial decision

an appeal

over the formal

an initial decision

"findings

or an

556 (b).

§

therefore,

Either

and jurisdiction

of fact and law asserted". 265An employee

adjudication,

The

"time, place and nature

of the hearings"26~, the "legal authority
under which the hearing

the

becomes

APA

§

557 (c).

the final decision

or

is taken to the agency where the agency may

262 see: Marcello v. Bonds, 349 u. s. 302, 75 S.ct. 757,
99 L.Ed. 1107 (1985); either there is explicit congressional
indication in the statute or the legislative history has to
be questioned, see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra
note 24, p.277
263APA

§

554 (b) (1)

264AP A

§

554 (b )(2 )

265AP A

§

554 (b) (3 )

266who is an employee of the agency but nevertheless is
quite independent; very informative: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24, pp.441 - 445
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undertake

a de novo review of the Administrative

Law Judge's

initial decision.
(2) All agency decisions
adjudication

are informal

only the rulemaking
procedural

that are not rulemaking

framework

the informal

there is no procedural
As nevertheless

are made through

informal

there have to be certain guidelines
the agency action. Procedural
through

the due process

Because

are affected.

most of the

have to be provided

The question

what procedural

safeguards

there can not be a general

standard

with the

for all informal

(as the advantage

adjUdications

is that they deal with individual

of the informal

only figures out the procedural

cases) this

requirements

by the due process clause for each respective

individual

case. The first question

of the private

interests

concerns

and

the importance

at stake, the second question

~67see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

case.

of the Supreme Court.

adjudications

ordered

that is

in the respective

to figure this out was established

v. Eldridge~68 decision

guideline

for

for courts to control

are needed and have to be guaranteed

Matthews

framework

adjudications~67

safeguards

though is especially

A guideline

with a

- clause but only to the extent that

life, liberty or property
important

As the APA provides

and the formal adjudication

adjudication.

agency actions

adjudication.

nor formal

supra note 24, p. 317

U8 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.ct. 893, 47 L.Ed. 2d 18 (1976)
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concerns

the risk of an erroneous

interests

through

deprivation

the used procedures

is about the governmental

or agency's

this inquiry several and different
can be ordered
In P.B.G.C.
APA

§

for the respective

through

interests.

procedural

Through

requirements

formal adjudication.

imposes on agencies

to provide an explanation

the use of informal

of course can be reviewed
capricious"

and the last question

v. L.T.C. corp.269 the Supreme Court found that

706 (2)(A) implicitly

requirement

of the private

for an action taken

adjudication.

on whether

a procedural

These explanations

they are "arbitrary,

or "an abuse of discretion",

APA

§

706 (2)(A).

(dd) The reviewing

court shall review and decide all

relevant

questions

of law, APA

requires

a court to decide whether

arbitrary

and capricious.

APA

706. APA

§

§

decision

with statutory

the agency gave sufficient

for an

The procedures

is obliged to obey are reviewable

the

by the court as
guidelines

and

supply of reasoned

analysis.270

269496 U.S. 633, 110 S.ct. 2668, 110 L.Ed.2d
270Motor Vehicles
Mutual Automobile

was

when new issues

of factfinding

action are inadequate.

well as any inconsistency
whether

the agency's

factfinding

are raised or when the procedures

agency

706 (2)(A)

706 (2)(F) rules that a

court shall review the agency's

adjudicatory

§

579 (1990)

Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.ct.

107

3) scope of review

a) "findings
APA

§

of fact" and "conclusions

706 regulates

of law"

the extent of judicial

review of

administrative

actions,

the "reviewing

court shall decide all relevant

law, interpret

constitutional

determine
agency

the meaning

action".

only to a limited

a certain
agencies
Because

and statutory

of applicability

As was mentioned

the administrative

discretionary

the scope of review.

agencies

before271

extent if the agencies

way often delegate
do have discretion

and

many decisions

of

or reviewable

use their

authorizing

agencies

to act in

broad power so that the
in enforcing

and "ensure that agencies

are consistent
reflected

the statutory

aim.

with the legislative

in statutes

that delegate

act only in ways that
policy decisions
power to agencies"

The power of the judicial branch therefore

there

provisions,

of

of this courts often have to defer to agency's

decisions

general

questions

of the terms of an

are unreviewable

power. statutes

It rules that

is limited.

.272

In

there are three types of judicial review of facts,

is (i) de novo review,

substantial

evidence

2856, 77 L.Ed.2d

(ii) review with the

test and (iii) there is the question

443 (1983)

271

see supra PART III 1) c) p. 78; and PART III 1) d) p. 82

272

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 331
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whether

the agency acted arbitrary

its discretion.;m
be applied

The question

and capricious

or abused

which type of review has to

refers to the respective

statute

authorizing

the

agency to act and refers only to the extent of the judicial
review.

The review of the facts itself is made possible

through

APA

§ 557

adjudication

as the complete

conclusions

difficult

with informal

agencies

to state findings

informal

adjudications

on individuals

to Preserve

adjudication

statutes

may have severe

findings

action -

to engage

In a later decision276 the Supreme

supra note 10, p. 245

274 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
275Pierce/ShapirojVerkuil,
276P.B.G.C.

in

Park v. Volpe274 that a

must have "some basis"275 of the agency's

273P.Strauss,

impacts

Court found in its decision

Overton

review.

the

at all. As

court - to be able to review the agency's

in substantive

of

are more

do not require

and conclusions

nevertheless

the Supreme

statement

of the rule stated in the agency's

as the authorizing

reviewing

and

in informal

courts only can review the general

Cases dealing

Ci tizens

of all findings

As this is not necessary

the basis and the purpose
record.

statements

and formal

have to be stated on the record and therefore

are reviewable.
rulemaking

(c) for formal rulemaking

supra note 24,

v. L.T.C. Corp.,

496

p. 335

U.S. 633 (1990)
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Court strengthened

its Overton Park decision.

found that a reviewing
"brief explanationtt277
rUlemaking.

The Court

court had the right to demand a
if an agency acted through

This decision was based on APA

informal

706 (2)(A)

§

which the Supreme Court read as to order the agency to state
an explanation

for its action to make it possible

reviewing

court to find out whether

arbitrary

and capricious.

often defer to an agency's

conclusions

the statutes

of the statutes.

agency's

experience

they are dealing with because

very often find the agency's
corresponding

findings of

of law the courts very

construction

Courts defer to the respective
concerning

the agency acted

Not only concerning

facts but also concerning

for the

interpretation

with the legislative

they accept that the agencies

history278

they

of the statute's
and because

do have greater expertise.

279

In N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Publ. Inc. 280 the Supreme Court stated
that " where the question
a broad statutory
administering

is one of specific

term in a proceeding

application

of

in which the agency

the statute must determine

it initially,

277

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p.336

278

P.Strauss,

279

see R. Nagareda,

280

332 U. S. 111, 64 S. ct . 851, 88 L. Ed . 1170 (1944)

supra note 10, p. 250
supra note 37, 591, 593

the

110

reviewing

court's

of a statute

function

made by the agency

as it has "warrant

Inc. v. Natural
I1new standard

Court's

Resources

policy

has spoken

of this "Chevron

the second question

decision

a

for courts

which were made upon

administered

- test"

by the

is whether

for the court

was based on a permissible

the statute. 284The Supreme

restricted

U. S.A. ,

council283 established

of agencies

of statutes

in

Congress

to the issue at all. If it did (but not

explicitly)

combined

in Chevron,

basis

agency.

First question

agency's

decision
Defense

choices

as long

and a reasonable

of reviewl1 which made it difficult

legal interpretations
respective

should be accepted

in the record

law" .282The Supreme

to overturn

is limited".281 The interpretation

with the Vermont
the authority

rules for agencies,
ensure ,consistency

Courts decision
Yankee decision

of federal

to review agency
in agency

is whether
construction

in Chevron
"severely

courts to prescribe
legal analysises,

interpretations,

to

and, to some

281 id.ad 131
282 ide ad 131
283 467 U. S . 837,

104

S. ct . 2778,

the

81 L.

Ed. 2d 694 (1984)

284see: Kenneth W. Starr, "Judicial Review in the Post Chevron Era", 3 Yale J. on Reg. 283,287 (1986)

of

111
extent,

to overturn

agency pol icy choices".

decision

makes it more difficult

agency's

conclusions

respective
control

The

judicial

broad

power. Either way the statute shows
intent and the arbitrary

and capricious

test

for further inquiries.

b) substantial
§

of law it still is not impossible.

or the statute may be broad and authorize

legislators'

APA

for a court to review an

statute may be narrow and order a strict

discretionary

remains

Though the

285

evidence

706 (2)(E) rules that the "reviewing

held unlawful
(E) unsupported

court shall-

and set aside agency action
by substantial

found to be

evidence

II.

does not define or explain what "substantial
the Supreme Court evaluated
several decisions.

and invented

In Consolidated

evidence

adequate

to support a conclusion"

evidence"

a standard

evidence

as a reasonable

helped to define the substantial

As the APA
is -

in

Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.U6

the Court stated that "Substantial
relevant

(2)

••.• means such

mind might accept as
.287

Another

evidence

285

K.Starr,

U6

305 U.S. 197, 59 S.ct. 206, 83 L.Ed.126

287

id. ad 229

decision

that

was Universal

supra note 284, p. 306
(1938)
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Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B •.288 This decision
evidence

must be "sufficient

reasonable

to support the conclusion

person after considering

as a whole, not just the evidence
the agency's

finding".

and the informal

289

record

that is consistent

with

the informal

procedures

rulemaking

the APA does not

rule that the findings of fact have to be reviewed
substantial
organic

evidence

of a

the evidentiary

Concerning

adjudication

stated that the

under the

test. Instead of the APA the respective

act of the agency sometimes

does290

of the agency's

and the notice,

comments

and statements

basis of the

informal

rule serve the courts to use the substantial

evidence

test.

c) de novo review
When "fundamental

rights" or constitutional

rights are at

issue the court may expand its scope of review and grant de
novo review.

288

291

De novo review means that a new tribunal

will

340 U. S . 474, 71 S. ct . 456, 95 L. Ed • 456 (1951)

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24, p.337; in a case
that might be seen as an "extreme" one the Court held that
an agency can base its finding on a "reasonable prudent
person"(Pierce/ShapirojVerkuil,
supra note 24, p.339) even
if this hearsay evidence should be contradicted by a nonhearsay evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91
S.ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)

~9

ao

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 339

291
a thorough article about de novo review: Judah
A. Shechter, "De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative

113
examine the arguments and the evidence292 of the respective
case anew. This so - called
that
facts

a full

jUdicial

are at issue

Ben Avon doctrine293 that

review is necessary
was established

v. Ben Avon Brough.294An earlier
still

law"296ruled

that

worth living".
consti tutional

in Ohio Valley water Co.
case295which is "clearly

takes

that

makes live

is necessary

where

review is at stake. 2!18
The balancing

of the de novo review of constitutional

facts

Agency Factual Determinations Implicating
Rights", 88 Columbia L.Rev. 1483 (1988)
292Kenneth F. Warren, "Administrative
~3 K.C.Davis,

to de novo

away "all

297De novo review therefore
fact

if constitutional

a person has a right

review when an agency action

ruled

most likely

Constitutional

Law", p.397 (1982)

supra note 39, p.69

294253 U.S. 287, 40 S.ct. 527, 64 L.Ed. 908 (1920); this
Ben Avon doctrine "may not only be dead but forgotten"
K.Davis, supra note 39, p.69
295Ng Fung Ho v. white,
L•Ed• 938 (1922)
296K.c. Davis,

259 U.S. 276, 42 S.ct.

supra note 39, p. 69

297259 U.S• 276, 284
298see:

J.Shechter,

supra note 291, 1483,1486

test

492, 66

is
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the one established

in the Matthews

v. Eldridge299

decision

of the Supreme Court.

d) the "arbitrary
As the informal
subjected

and capricious"

rulemaking

test

and informal

to the substantial

evidence

adjudication

are not

test but nevertheless

there has to be some form of review - the APA makes it
possible

for courts to review the agency's

under the arbitrary
capricious

and capricious

test therefore

is the only standard

as the precise meaning of the arbitrary
several changes.

of facts

test. 300 The arbitrary

that applies to certain agency actions.

have undergone

findings

301

and

of review

The extent as well

and capricious

In Louisiana

Pacific

test

states

Box & Basket Co. v. Whi te302 the Supreme Court established
"loose rational
test primarily

relation"

test. This loose rational

In its Overton Park303

decision

Supreme Court turned away from this loose rational
test and articulated

that the arbitrary

424 U. S . 319 (1976)

300

APA

301

P. Strauss,

~2

296 U.S. 176, 56 S.ct. 159, 82 L.Ed. 138 (1935)

~3

401 U.S. 402 (1971)

706 (2 )(A)
supra note 10, p. 248

rights

the
relation

and capricious

299

§

relation

was used in cases where no fundamental

have been involved.

a

test
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should be "searching

and careful".

The explicit

the judicial review of the arbitrary
not quite clear though.
an eminent difference
and the arbitrary

304

Whereas

would be required
is impossible
supported

difference

test

between

test "requires

by the substantial

only by evidence

evidence

test the D.C. Circuit

and capricious

to conceive

test is

some believe that there is

stated that "there is no substantive
what" the arbitrary

and capricious

between the substantial

and capricious

extent of

evidence

a "nonarbitrary"

and what

test, since it

factual

that is not substantial

judgement
in the

APA sense ...". 305 Though this may be a "simplified
statementu306

this decision

and capricious
judicial

e)

level of
record - does

has to differ very much from the substantial

excess of statutory

statutory

a certain

test.

The questions

304

test can establish

review that - applied to the agency's

not necessarily
evidence

makes clear that the arbitrary

whether

jurisdiction,

jurisdiction?

an agency acted "in excess of
authority

or limitation,

or short of

see: P. Strauss , supra note 10, p.248

Association of Data Processing service organization,
Inc. V. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
745 F.2d 677, 240 U.S. App. D.C. 301 (D.C.Cir. 1984)

~5

at least that is what P. Strauss thinks, see supra
note 10, p. 249
306
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statutory

right"307 or "without observance

required

by law,p08 will be examined

is reviewable

can review

by the

and if there is "law to apply" a court

the agency's

defer to the agency's
reasonable

decision

even though courts have to

interpretation

as long "as a

mind might accept" the agency's

adequate

to support

expressed

decision

a conclusion".310 If therefore

"as

Congress

its intent and the agency chose a certain

interpretation
substitute
M.L.R.B.
already

implicitly

court in most cases. As was mentioned309 if the

reviewing
action

of procedure

of the statute the reviewing

its own decision

stated

in 1944 that "the Board's

is to be accepted
reasonable

for that of the agency.311 In the

publications312 decision

v. Hearst

court may not

if it has warrant

the Supreme

determination

in the record and a

basis in law". And though the Supreme

this decision

it nevertheless

~7 APA

§

706 (2)(C)

308AP A

§

706 (2) (D)

Court

Court found

used to decide different

in

309see supra PART III, 1), pp. 77 - 83
3~ Consolidated Edison Co. v. M.L.R.B.,
59 S.ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)
311see: p.strauss,

305 U.S. 197, 229

supra note 10, pp. 249 - 256

312 322 U. S • 111 , 64 S.Ct • 851, 88 L. Ed • 1170 (1944)
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some cases313 until it found the Chevron314 - decision.
the Chevron
step inquiry

decision

the Supreme Court established

in the agency's

interpretation

later decisions315 the Supreme
"tradi tional
"working"

with the Chevron

used

to find out whether

Congress

"spoke" to the question

agency's

construction

disagree

about the use of those traditional

at issue and to review an

of a statute.

Even if the Justices

interpretation

can be controlled

by courts without

the statutory

interpretation

may

tools there is a

basis with which the statutory

substituting

In

construction"316 while

standard

and reviewed

a two

of statutes.

Court Justices

tools of statutory

With

of agency's

of the judges for

the one of the agency.

f)

"hard look" - review

Besides

the substantial

evidence

test there also is the

"hard look" review which has been established

313see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

through

supra note 24, p. 340

314 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
315K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Corp., 486 U.S. 281, 108 S.ct.
1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988); Public citizens v. United
States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S.ct. 2558,
105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)
316Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p.352
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Supreme

Court decisions.

317

The idea of the "hard look" was

to give courts the possibility
had found its decision
respective

questions

to review whether

through taking a hard look at the

it was concerned

with318 Nowadays

themsel ves take a "hard look" at the agency's
This "hard look" is used especially
important

topics

an agency

like health,

courts

decision.

in subjects

319

concerning

safety and environment320

but

of course the courts can take the "hard look" only to the
extent to which the judges "understandtl321
topic.

The scope of review used with the "hard look" review

may have different
"close scrutiny".
reasoned
control

322

names, e.g. "substantial

decisionmaking
whether

and should be narrow concerning

the agencies

the

stayed within their statutory

e.g. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
463 U.S. 29 (1983)
see: P.Strauss,

inquiry" or

The review itself shall look for a

317

318

the respective

Ass. v. State Farm,

supra note 10, p.268

see: William H. Rodgers, "A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee:
Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny", 67 Georgetown L.J.
699,704 (1979): "In the courts, •..• the most important
expression of the movement to reassert systematic control
over agency decisionmaking is called the hard look doctrine
of judicial review"
319

no

P.Strauss,

supra note 10, p.268

321

M. Shapiro,

supra note 200, 1487, 1507

322

W .Rodgers , supra note 319, p. 704
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authorization.323

The borders to the substantial

evidence

test may not be very clear but the hard look review may
establish

a more narrow view than the substantial

test. At least in cases concerning
informal

adjudication

the arbitrary

g) Chevron,

an additional

and capricious

in Chevron,

Council

standard

the hard look of review besides

test.

interpreted

interpretation

the term "stationary

of the
source"

is a term used in the 1970 and 1977 Amendments
was whether

of this term was correct or whether
contrary

to the legislators

that decided
explicitly

of the

the interpretation

the agency acted

intent. The Court of Appeals326

the case first found that Congress

did not

express how it wanted the term "stationary

source" to be interpreted.

As Congress

3D

W.Rodgers,

324

see supra PART III, 2) e)

325

see: K.Starr,

685

by the

U.S.A. Co. v. Natural Resources

Clean Air Act. 325 The question

326

test324,

dealt with a statutory

E.P.A •• The agency
which

evidence

and

U.S.A. v. N.R.D.C.

The decision
Defense

rulemaking

which are not made reviewable

APA under the substantial
review establishes

informal

evidence

did not explicitly

supra note 319, 705

supra note 284, p. 288

F.2d 718,222

U.S. App. D.C. 268 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
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state how it wanted this term to be interpreted
Appeals

"felt free"327 to set the E.P.A. 's interpretation

aside and substitute
Court of Appeals
"incompatible
stevens

it with its own interpretation.

found that the E.P.A.'s

with Congress'

decision.

critizised

that the D.C. Circuit
for the agency's

Congress

did not explicitly

and substituted

Justice

stevens mainly
its own

its intent.3~ The
the Court of Appeals

the interpretation

the Justices

thought

would be the correct

Circuit

or the one of the E.P.A. but it deferred

E.P.A.is

interpretation

up its "longstanding
only critizising

and with the Chevron

to the

decision

gave

case ....
by - case approach". 330More than

Court gave a good example

327K.Starr,

one for that of the D.C.

the Court of Appeals

about how to approach

the D.C.

even after finding that

express

Court did not just reverse

was

purpose". 328Justice

substituted

decision

The

interpretation

Court and overturned

In this decision

decision

decision

remedial

wrote for an unanimous

Circuits

Supreme

the Court of

decision

and established

an agency's

the Supreme

a new standard

interpretation

of a

supra note 284, p. 287

328 685 F. 2d 718, 726 - 727
329K.Starr,

supra note 284, p.287

330Maureen B. Callahan, "A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron,
U.S.A., V. Natural Resources Defense Council",
1991 Wis.L.Rev. 1275, 1281 (1991)
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statute.

This new standard

of review contained

approach

to the respective

statutory

first of the two steps concerns
Congress

has explicitly

inquiry

into legislative

statute's
second

language

question

as well as the legislative
approach

If Congress'

with respect

only if

if it is the agency

to the specific

based on a permissible

construction

this two step approach

the Supreme

the most important

administrative

the agency's

issue, the

answer is

Court established
law decisions

is directed

who cri ticise the

at the use of the

841 - 843

"3 467 U.S. 837, 841
334K.Starr,

supra note 284, p.312

335see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

"one of

in recent

supra note 284, p.288

467 U. S • 837,

is

of the statute". 333With

there are also scholars

decision.335 This criticism

332

is necessary

Court stated was: "[I]f the statute

for the court is whether

"1 K.Starr,

history. 331The

intent should not be clear the second

the Supreme

memory"334 though

the

court have to defer to the legislators

silent or ambiguous
question

whether

intent should be made regarding

intent is not clear because

and the reviewing
will.3~

the question

at issue. The

spoken to the matter at issue. This

step of this Chevron

Congress'

question

a two step

supra note 24, p. 352
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"traditional

tools" because they can be used by the judges

to direct the decision

and to receive a desired result.

4) requirements

a) availability

of jUdicial review

As was discussed
reviewability

earlier336

there is the presumption

which is favored especially

704. Therefore

by APA

§§

unless "(1) statutes preclude

judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed

strengthened

by law". 337 This presumption

congressional

statute to preclude

intent expressed

and other

and visible

in the

jUdicial review or unless there is "no

review therefore

to obtain jUdicial

is available

336

see supra PART III, 1) b), pp. 75 - 78

337

APA

§

was

so that unless there is clear and

law to apply" there is the possibility
review. Judicial

to agency

of reviewability

by several Supreme Court decisions338

federal court decisions339
convincing

703,

if an agency takes a certain action this

action should be reviewable

discretion

of

in most cases

701 (a)

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967);
citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971)
338

39

Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, (D.C. Cir.1986)
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where the administrative
unless otherwise

agencies

act towards

indi viduals340)

stated in the statute.

b) standing
Main purpose of the law of standing

is to avoid the misuse

of the jUdicial branch. The requirement
vaguely mentioned

in APA

§

of standing

702: "A person suffering

wrong because of agency action, or adversely
aggrieved

is
legal

affected or

by agency action within the meaning of a relevant

statute,

is entitled

standing

therefore

to judicial review". The law of

is necessary

people who really have suffered

to distinguish

between the

a "legal wrong" and those

who just do not agree with the agency action or think that a
different

action would be better. As the law of standing

not enacted explicitly
changes.

in a statute it has undergone

is

several

Not only have there been many changes but there

also have been different
of standing

attitudes

towards the requirements

at the same time. 341.

this "general move" towards more protection of the
individual was very much favored (if not "founded") by the
Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly [397 U.S. 254,
90 S.ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed 2d 287 (1970)] which refused to
furtheron enforce the distinction between benefits and
privileges concerning protection given by the due process
clause

340

see: K.C.Davis, supra note 21, vOl.4, p. 208: " ...main
failure of the law of standing is ... the inconsistency,
unreliability, and inordinate complexity"
341.
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From the beginning
wanted

on it was clear that the person who

to take legal action had to be "adversely

affected".342 How this was to be defined
clear.

One of the Supreme

requirements

of standing

Court's

though was not

approaches

was to demand

towards

that a legal right

was injured. 343If a legal right of the plaintiff
had standing.

violated

he/she

approach

was that the person hurt through

One of the problems

had to show that the action was illegal.
always

statutes

authorizing

- being a common

and limiting

agency actions

standing

to persons

attorney

who wanted

of this

the agency action
As there are not

the plaintiff

general"

had to

this action might

not have been held illegal before. 344Another
"private

was

law system - explicitly

prove that the action was illegal though

the so called

the

approach

doctrine

was

that gave

to assert a public

interest.345

342a thorough and general chapter to the history and
evolution of the law of standing: K.C. Davis, supra note 21,
vol. 4, pp. 230 - 235
343Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 44 S.ct. 317,
68 L.Ed. 667 (1924); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A.,
306 U.S. 118, 59 S.ct. 366, 83 L.Ed.543 (1939)
344see: K.C.Davis,

supra note 21, vol. 4, p.232

345Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24, p. 134/135;
e.g.: Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.ct. 1942,
20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)

see
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And though these two attempts to establish
standing

probably

have been the most important,

have been two of several attempts.

346

organizations,

in Association

they only

The law of standing

used today was invented and established
Court's decision

a useful law of

in the Supreme

of Data Processing

Service

Inc. v. Camp347 and to a certain degree can be

seen as a mixture of these two earlier approaches

towards

standing.
In this decision
approach

the Supreme Court developed

to find out whether the plaintiff

a two step

has standing or

not. The Court required that a party has to have (i) an
injury in fact which must be (ii) "within the zone of
interests

to be protected

consti tutional
approach

guarantee

or regulated
in question".

by the statute or
348

This two step

is a clearly defined standard but there

nevertheless

still remain questions

concerning

the law of

standing which are answered only slowly through following
Supreme Court decisions.
The requirement
necessary

of an "injury in fact" is of course

because without an injury there is no "case or

William A. Fletcher, "The Structure
98 Yale L.J. 221,224-229 (1988)

346

397

347

348

of Standing",

U.S. 150, 90 S.ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d

397 U. S . 150, 153

184 (1970)
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controversy" .349The injury in fact can be an economic,
aesthetic,
decision

conservational

or recreational

the Court therefore

requirement
plaintiff

injury. with this

turned away from the

of the "legal injury" though of course the
still has to have a legal right to jUdicial

enforcement
complained

of an asserted

legal duty. 350The injury that is

about has to be caused by the "illegal ,,351
action

of the administrative
have declared

agency which the plaintiff

void. The judicial decision that is seeked

must be capable of remedying

the injury352 and the plaintiff

of course has to be among the individuals
agency's

injured by the

action. This injury may even be a "procedural

injury'P53 what means that if procedural
plaintiff

tries to

are hurt and he/she receives

this the requirements
The second requirement

rights of the
an injury through

of the "injury in fact" are fulfilled.
is fulfilled

if the injury is within

the zone of interests of the respective

statute or even

349Maria E.Mansfield, "Standing and Ripeness Revisited: the
Supreme Courts 'Hypothetical Barriers''', 68 N.D.L.Rev. 1,
p 26 (1992)
300W.Fletcher,

supra note 346,221,229

351the action which is claimed to be illegal
3~ Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.ct. 1146,
35 L.Ed. 2d 536 (1973)
353Nancy S. Grief, "Where Do We Stand Now?",
33 Nat. Resources J. 507, p.2 (1993)
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within a constitutional
well as legislative

guarantee.

statutory

language as

intent have to be questioned

whether

the respective

statute's

certain

issue354 which is questioned

to find out

intent is to protect the
is the specif ic case.

Though to find out whether the zone of interest does exist
in the respective

case is a "duty" after Data processing

the

supreme Court often only focused on the first step, the
injury in fact.355

In cases where the court only examined the

injury in fact it has found that the proof of the injury was
enough to establish
When associations
they establish
standing

standing.

356

want to sue on behalf of their members

standing

if "its members would otherwise

to sue in their own right", the interests

are interests

that comply with the associations

no individual

participation

is necessary.

355

W. Fletcher,

at stake

purpose and

357

"the test is not meant to be especially
Clarke v. securities industry Association,
107 s.ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)

354

have

demanding",
479 U.S. 388,

supra note 346, 221,258

see esp.: united states v. students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 412 U.S. 669,
93 S.ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973)
356

Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising commission,
432 U.S. 333, 97 S.ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)

357
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c) timing
To avoid the abuse of the jUdicial branch the plaintiffs

do

not only have to have standing and a "case,P58 but other
requirements

also have to be fulfilled.

these requirements

The main purpose of

is not to avoid an abuse of the jUdicial

branch but to ensure that the dispute between the individual
and the agency has not been settled after certain
administrative
obtained

procedures

and therefore

and requirements

can only be solved by the jUdicial

branch. These requirements
a final decision,
exhausted

are fulfilled

all administrative

and the court therefore

decisionmaking

have been

if the agency made

remedies have been

can not interfere with the

process of the agency.

(aa) One of the requirements

that has to be fulfilled

before

the court reviews the action is that the case has to be
"ripe". The law of ripeness

is a judge - made law and may be

seen as an outflow of the "case or controversy"
of art. 111.359 The law of ripeness'
advisory

opinions.

requirement

aim is to avoid giving

This judge - made law has undergone

several changes since its "creation" .360The requirement

that

a case has to be ripe before there can be a trial before a

3~ Art III of the
3M K.C.Davis,

u.s.

Constitution

supra note 39, p.82

~o a case reflecting
the "ripeness - doctrine" in "earlier
days": International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S.
222, 74 S.ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954)
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court is fulfilled
administrative

if an official

position

of an

agency bears the danger to harm individuals

severely.361 Therefore

the "present

law of ripeness

is based

on a proper balance between the need for concerning
resources

and the need for relieving

jUdicial

private parties

from

debili tating uncertainties". 362The change towards this
understanding

of the law of ripeness

v. Gardner.363 In its general

Laboratories
ripeness
prevent

the Court stated:

the courts, through avoidance
from entangling

disagreements

over administrative

the agencies

administrative

felt in a concrete
this decision

policies,

and also to

interference

has been formalized

the Supreme Court "invented"

until an

and its effects

parties" .364In
a two step test

a case is ripe or not. The controversial

issue has to be "fit" for review and the "hardship
parties withholding

to the

court consideration"365 has to be

3D K.C. Davis, supra note 39, p.82
362K.C.Davis,

is to

in abstract

way by the challenging

to find out whether

about

of premature

themselves

from jUdicial

decision

statement

"[I]ts basic rationale

adjudication,

protect

was made in Abbott

supra note 21, vol. 4, p.410

363 387

U. S .

136 (1967)

364 387

U. S.

136, 149

365 387

U. S.

136, 149
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considered.

Though

it might be difficult

case is "fit" - Justice Harlan writing
that the question
question

at issue concerned

of statutory

into Congress'

when a

for the Court found

a "purely legal

construction "366where only research

intent was necessary

issue was final in the sense of APA
"fitness

to determine

and that the action at
§

704. Therefore

of the issue" and the possible

"hardship

affected"367 contain the answer to the question

to the

whether

a

case is ripe or not.
(bb) A plaintiff
administrative
case before
important
remedies

seeking

remedies

jUdicial review has to exhaust
that are available

all

in the specific

seeking relief in a federal court.368 An

case dealing with the exhaustion
was Myers v. Betlehem

Shipbuilding

of administrative
Corp ..369In this

case the Supreme Court held that a court may not enjoin
administrative

proceedings

on a complaint

before the

366Robert C. Powell, "Help is Sometimes Close at Hand: The
Exhaustion Problem and the Ripeness SOlution",
1987 U.III.L.Rev. 547, 600 (1987)
3n

387 U.S. 136, 149

368Sonya Gidumal, "McCarthy v. Madigan: Exhaustion
Administrative Agency Remedies and Bivens",
7 Admin.L.J.Am.U.
373 (1993)
369 303 U. S. 41, 58 S.ct . 459, 82 L. Ed . 638 (193 8 )

of
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administrative

remedies were exhausted

even is the plaintiff

claimed that the agency would lack jurisdiction
Reasons

for this exhaustion

of powers doctrine
administrative
mistakes

requirement

and to establish

to act. 370

are the separation

an independent

agency which is able to correct its own

and will be oriented to have an efficient

as well as to preserve
In its decision

jUdicial economy.

3n

in McKart v. united States372 the Supreme

Court stated several reasons for the requirement
exhaustion.373

process

In this decision

there is the possibility
these possibilities

of

the Court stated that if

to use administrative

remedies

are not used by the plaintiff

and

- he/she

may not raise issues before a court that he/she could have
discussed

and possibly could have solved with the agency.

Though the exhaustion
requirement

of APA

§

doctrine may be similar to the
704 that a legal action can only be

taken against a final agency action there are differences
purpose

in

and proceeding.

303 U.S. 41, 47

370

3n a detailed
discussion of those reasons: Marcia R.
Gelpe, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from
Environmental Cases", 53 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1, 11 - 25 (1985)

395

372

373

U.S. 185, 89 S.ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d

see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

194 (1969)

supra note 24, pp. 177/178
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(cc) According
plaintiff

to APA

§

704 the action against which the

seeks to take legal action must be a final agency

action. Reason for this is to avoid interferences

of the

judicial branch with the administrative

Though

agencies.

this is one of the reasons for the doctrine
"exhaustion

of administrative

remedies"

of the

the damages that

might occur when a court interferes with an agency's
decisionmaking
doctrine

process are much more severe. The exhaustion

gives agencies the possibility

rethink their decisions
is necessary

to review and to

and to change them if they think it

or advisable.

If a court interferes

it will

"only" control the legality of that action which it will do
anyway sooner or later whereas
agency it substitutes
executive

if it decides

its opinion for that of a part of the

branch. The determination

whether an agency action

is final or not usually is not difficult.
problems

instead of the

Difficulties

and

may arise though when a "failure to act" or a

"rejection

to act" are concerned.

Fund, Inc. v. Hardin374
urgent and important
irretrievable
be available
administrative

In Environmental

Defense

the D.C. Circuit held that in very
cases or in cases where otherwise

injury might be received

an

jUdicial review can

before a final agency action was issued. "When
inaction has precisely

the same impact on the

rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot
preclude

374

judicial review by casting its decision

428 F.2d 1093, 138 U.S.

in the form

App. 391 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
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of inaction
another

rather than an order denying

relief".3~

decision376 in Environmental

"trendsetting"

In
Defense

Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus377 the D. C. Circuit ordered the
agency to take a certain action instead of postponing
decision.

This of course is a questionable

it may interfere
requirements
defended

intervention

with certain constitutional

and guidelines

as

and democratic

but this intervention

with the "public health hazards"

the

has been

that were at

stake. 378

d) primary

jurisdiction

The doctrine
doctrine
decide

of primary

and concerns

jurisdiction

the question

is a court made

whether

about a certain topic or whether

375D.C. Circuit,
note 24, p.171

a court may

this question

cited from PiercejShapirojVerkuil,

should

supra

376though the decisions of the D. C. Circuit are favorable
and "trendsetting" in this particular area of administrative
law they nevertheless seem to be the only one putting much
more weight on the danger of possible harm for individuals
than on strict statutory obedience
n7 439 F. 2d 584, 142 U.S. App. D.C. 74(D.C. Circuit

1971)

378as was mentioned supra in PART III B) c): "Discretionary
power not to take action is power to discriminate",
K.C.Davis, supra note 219; the problem that arises though
is: once orders like this are allowed (even if the interests
at stake may "justify" the action) - can this case be
distinguished in an objective and neutral manner from other
cases where this should not be allowed?

134

be dealt with by the agency. 379The primary
used especially

"for withholding

jurisdiction

judicial power in order to

make place for the agency". 380Therefore

this concept

by courts to "allocate

making

responsibility"~1
whole dispute
jurisdiction

initial decision

between

with the primary

the court will dismiss the case whereas

determinations.
primary

with final decisions

jurisdiction

but only with initial

A court will dismiss the dispute because

jurisdiction

because of the expertise

agency382 and to achieve a uniform treatment
issue. As different

Main use of the primary

of the specific
decisions

is within the

decision

concerning

379to primary jurisdiction in general:
Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24, pp. 190 - 194
380K.C. Davis, supra note 21, vol.4, p.82
3D Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 190

382in a common law country the judge shall be a
"generalist" and therefore he/she defers to the agency's
expertise and special knowledge, see supra PART I,
introduction
~3 R.C.Davis,

the

a uniform

jurisdiction

anti trust law. 383In the most important

of

of the

courts may make different

agency dealing with the issue will establish
standard.

if it

issue the court will wait until the agency

has spoken to the issue. Of course the primary
is not concerned

is used

an agency and a court. If it is a

that is in question

only is a certain

is

supra note 21, vOl.4, pp. 100 - 119
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primary

jurisdiction,

Railroad
formula

CO.384,

reason
whether

"fixed
whether

for applying

of primary

In every case the question

is whether

the purposes

of the doctrine

litigation".

the judges must decide

the agency

352

the
and

it serves will be aided by its

in the particular

formula"

are present

shall decide

As there is no

from case-to-case

the topic first or whether

the court can decide.

384

Pacific

the doctrine

for the existence

application

states v. Western

the Supreme Court stated that "[N]o fixed

exists

jurisdiction.

in United

U.S. 59, 77 S.ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d

126 (1956)

PART IV

HISTORIC

AND CULTURAL

INFLUENCES

LEGAL SYSTEMS AND THE JUDICIAL

ON THE AMERICAN

AND GERMAN

REVIEW

1) source of the law

History

and the experiences

with different

legal systems have had a great influence
establishment

and realization

legal systems

in general and especially

judicial
Besides

having

ruled country and society.

a society/community

and express personal

achieve

personal

the people wanted to

opinions

could

of their own. To

freedom not only in verbal expressions

system but the people's
content

Constitution

Instead of always

in which the members

one of the main goals. Not a regulated

As the people's

was fought to

system in which only a few non -

develop

important

the

action.

the duty to obey the "sovereign"

establish

and german

concerning

other reasons the war of independence

persons

and

on the

of the american

review of administrative

get rid of a political
elected

political

was

and standardized

will was thought to be the most

establishing

a free society.

will may change the framers of the

adopted the common law system which was thought

to reflect the people's

will better than a civil law system.
136
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As a result of this many requirements
obtain

and necessities

judicial review - and especially

successfully

- have been developed

Supreme Court. As the Justices

to obtain

to

it

and invented by the

of the Court are appointed

by

the elected head of the executive

branch they - at least to

a certain

the majority

people's

extent - often resemble
opinions

on certain issues. The jUdge-made-law

(combined with the jury system) therefore
people's

view. Of course this "reflection"

the explicit
whether

of the

often reflects

the

does not reach

words of the law but at least to the extent

something

should be viewed

"broad" or "conservative"

in a "liberal"

and "narrow"

opinion often is reflected

and

sense the people's

to some extent in the Court's

opinions.

Enacting

the Grundgesetz

main aim was to establish
abused

a legal system which could not be

in any way, either by an (possibly)

majority
country

the fathers of the Constitutions

or through the government.385
there is no judge-made-Iaw

the German Bundestag386

Being a civil law

but only law enacted by

and the German Bundesrat.

see esp.: E.Schmidt Assmann,
K.Stern, supra note 15, p.19

385

386

"House of Representatives"

387

"

Senate"

influenced

387

supra note 2, pp.995 - 998;
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Though
persons

the representatives

of the Bundestag

the voters do not have a thorough

representatives
Grundgesetz

was enacted the "fathers"

people by means of elections
a constitutional

political

process390

of the political

on their

of the Constitution

"shall be exercised

they "shall participate

will of the people".

and realize the people's

by the

and voting ...". 389 To give

right to participate

parties was constitutionally

influence

influence

and the laws they will enact. When the

wanted that all state authority388

parties

are elected

391

guaranteed

will. Nowadays

on their representatives

in the

in the forming

The existence

of

as forums to express
the people's

and on the law is less

than just "vague" because there has been an evolutionary
change

from a liberal and representative

system where the representatives
their membership

democracy

to a

are elected because

of

to a certain party and not because of their

ideas and ideals. People vote for a certain party because

which of course is something different than and does not
include the abstract purpose of the "rule of law"; the state
authority can only be exercised within the legal (and moral)
boundaries of the rule of law
388

3~

GG art. 20 (2)

this is one of the lessons from the "third Reich" where
the only party allowed was the NSDAP and therefore a
different "political organ" to express political opinions
was missing and the free expression of course did not exist
390

391

GG art. 21 (1)

139

they believe

that this respective

membership

to a certain party then "orders" the elected

representative
not because

to vote within the "party discipline"393 and

he/she wants to represent

the interests

voters. This "party - discipline"

and necessary
Chancellor

of

is understandable

at least to a certain extent: though the

is not an "officer"

of the Bundestag

nevertheless

from the Chancellor.
members

the same

of values on certain things392 as they do. The

concepts

his/her

party reflects

of the Bundestag
can withdraw

As the Chancellor

of the Bundestag

the Bundestag

the majority

their support

is elected by the
also can make a vote

of non - confidence

and discharge

the Chancellor.

that the Chancellor

(different than the U.S. President)

have to have the support of the majority
To support the Chancellor394 the members

This means
does

of the Bundestag.
of the respective

party to a certain degree have to vote within the party discipline.

Though to a certain degree the source of the law

can be seen as the people's
conservative

will expressing

or liberal preferences

their

while voting for the

Bundestag

the main source or the law is the legislator's

negative:

the party's)

will. This is a good reflection

392which means that they vote "conservative", "liberal"
"social democratic" and not because one representative
thinks different about a certain issue than another
393see: supra p. 3; H. Steinberger,
394who in usually

(or

supra note 4, p. 128

is the head of the respective

party

or
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though of the believe that in a civil law country not the
majority

of the people make the law but only the

representati ves395 because not a subjective
abstract

principle

opinion but an

of justice shall be the source of the

law.
As a source of law the people's
significant
whereas

influence

in Germany

will therefore

in the United states'

the people's

has a quite

legal system

will is not important

as a

source of the law.

2) aim and purpose

As was mentioned
independence
influence

of the law

above one of the aims of the war of

was to change the political

the people had on decisions

The answer and opposite
monarchy

political

was the liberal democracy

is the main order.

system and the

concerning

society.

system to the British
where the majority's

"We the people .••" therefore

only mean that the people do establish

will

does not

the community

but

this attitude towards the law changed during the
years though; people now often believe that they should have
more "rights" to determine the law and influence on how the
law should be; in some state constitutions there is the
possibility that if a certain percentage of the state
inhabitants want a certain law the state legislator has to
discuss and vote about this proposal; also in most of the
states there is the possibility for plebiscites on certain
issues; these two possibilities luckily do not exist on the
federal level
395
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also that the people's will is the main source of the law
and the legal system.396
As a response

to the history the

people and shall therefore
people's

u.s.

represent

law shall serve the
and reflect the

will. Though nobody will deny that to achieve

justice in an abstract

sense surely is one purpose of the

law it is not the purpose of the legal system. The common
law and the case by case system serves the individual
consideration

and not an abstract

principle.

Though the Constitution

of the Weimarer

Republic

democratic

Constitution

it was possible

to transform

democratic

republic

dictator.

Enacting

into a totalitarian
the "eternity

the fathers of the Grundgesetz

clause"

arbitrary
servants
establish

avoid the possibility

decisions

the

country ruled by a
in GG art. 79 (3)

ensured that the democratic

system as such could not be transformed
~o furthermore

was a

of sovereign

or changed.

of uncontrolled

acting agencies/civil

the aim of the fathers of the Grundgesetz

was to

a legal system in which the rule of law should be

the most important

and most central constitutional

demand.

396
Hamilton, Madison and Jay thought that the separation of
powers and elections of the representatives would be enough
to establish justice and freedom, see: W. Brugger, supra
note 1., p.22/23; they did not intend to enact civil rights
as they thought the people's will would be reasonable enough
and the enactment of the Constitution would be a significant
sign itself
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Therefore

the enacted

laws serve the abstract

the rule of law39" and is not necessarily
to the people's

will and demand.

398

principle

of

enacted to respond

The law of course is not

only enacted to serve the rule of law as an abstract
principle
individual

but as the law should serve the community
the Grundgesetz

and the individual
subjective

will

and the

tries to protect the community

living in it and not necessarily

of the individuals

the

forming the community.

As a part of the legal system the judicial review of
administrative
abstract

actions

is primarily

justice and not necessarily

oriented

to serve the

the individual

justice.

though there are several different opl.nl.onsconcerning
the question which requirements constitute the "rule of law"
principle the main features are established in several
articles of the Grundgesetz (e.g. separation of powers,
democracy); what is controversial nowadays only is the
extent to which certain values represented by the rule of
law can be or shall be stretched and expanded; this
especially concerns "social obligations" and "guarantees of
equality" of the government which some scholars think to be
connected closely with the principle of the rule of law (but
which should be a question concerning the extent of the
"social state principle" which also is a requirement of the
Constitution); GG art 20 (1): "The Federal Republic of
Germany is a democratic and social federal state"; to the
content and extent of the "social federal state" see:
R.Herzog, "Die Verfassungsentscheidung
fuer die
sozialstaatlichkeit",
pp.295 - 326, in : Maunz/Duerig, supra
note 17

397

as mentioned above the possibility that the proposal of
an abstract principle may oppose or even harm individuals is
accepted, see supra pp.1/2; E. Schmidt Assmann, supra
note 2, p.1030

398
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The differences

between the purpose of the law therefore

quite significant

between the american

is

and the german legal

systems.

3) different

attitudes

administrative

The differences

towards the government

agencies

in the historical

and cultural

towards

and the development

purpose

of the law of the respective

different

attitude

administrative

and

of the source and aims and
country also reflects

towards the government

agencies

attitudes

that represent

a

and the

the sovereign

power.

In the United states there is the common believe that the
government
control

should be "small" and without much influence

over the daily routine and society.

response

to the historic

pOlitical

systems399

that "liberty"
Liberty

experiences

and expresses

and

This is a

with different

the established

believe

should be the main feature of this society.

not only in a "negative"

meaning

and as a defense

though the declaration of independence was made to
establish a liberal democracy as a response to the British
monarchy many "Americans" came to this continent after the
war of independence was over; they wanted to evacuate from
the respective country and political system which not
necessarily had to be a monarchy but which in most cases
surely had a severe influence on the "individual liberties"
of their inhabitants; the "small government" on one side and
the possibility of liberty and individualism On the other
side therefore certainly have been very important reasons
for many people to come to the United states
399
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against

governmental

positive

regulation

sense as a realization

responsibility.
a government

and "control"
and proposal

When the influence

but also in a
of the self -

and exercise

should be as small as possible

of power of

it is necessary

to have as few laws as possible.
In Germany

it is to the contrary.

government

should have a strong influence

Throughout

the last ten centuries

country

It is thought that the

Germany

upon the society.
has always been a

in which there has been a strong sovereign

in which people believed
the society.
sovereign

400

and awareness

and where lots of laws regulated

Though the common believe

authority

of its actions nevertheless

of the disasters

in the recent history.

this deprivation

not sUbjective

justice should be guaranteed

jUdicial protection
government
possibility

in a strong

still is quite widespread

well as the constitutional

authority

401

interests

the sceptizism

increased

As a response

against sovereign

has a strong influence

to

but an abstract

through the Constitution

guarantee

because

as

of an efficient
actions.

Though the

on society there is the

to take legal action against each action that

may harm subjective

rights of the individuals.

400
one of the first books where the law was codified
the "Sachsenspiegel", written ca. 1224 - 1233

was

the deprivation of the law, the genocide and the
degeneration of the political system have been enforced
the "government" and within their authority (though of
course this was not a legally and democratic confirmed
authority)
401

by
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This was thought
and regulating

to be a mixture

government

of an organizing,

providing

on one side and the ensurance

of

justice on the other side. To the same extent as it is much
more difficult
thorough
Germany

in a big country

influence

on all citizens

with many inhabitants

government

to regulate

the community.
of the german
executive

in a small country

it is a necessity

and organize

society

constitution

like

for the

and the life in

Also as an answer to the history

a narrow

the fathers

tried to ensure that the

"checks and balance"

Chancellor

is elected

discharged

by the members

system the fathers

by the Bundestag

and dependent

- system as the

and also can be

of the Bundestag.

of the Grundgesetz

and independent

executive

to have a

could not act just the way it wanted to. Therefore

they invented

strong

u.s.

like the

branches

Enacting

tried to avoid very

but as they are connected

from each other the legislative

branch

should control

forced to find democratic

this

and the

each other and should be

compromises

in difficult

situations.
The american
widely

President

uncontrolled

only be discharged

as the head of the executive

and not responsible
by impeachment

to Congress.

This very strict realization

separation

is balanced

and balances"

enacted

is very independent
the solution

in his decisions
problems

of the

by the system of "checks

in the Constitution.

of certain

He can

and he is not dependable

on any other branch.
of powers

is

As the President

and attitudes

he therefore

towards

is relatively
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free on how he "executes
agencies

the laws". The administrative

very often are enacted to solve certain problems

and to help the President
help the President

to execute the laws. As they shall

and not Congress

to execute the laws they

have to execute the laws the way the President
politically

the relationships

between the sovereign

and the

(like e.g. the Social Security Administration)

of the agencies

are a part of the political

are a part of the executive

they are enacted to administrate
solve. Therefore
discretionary
executive

the enacting

authority

process.

and the political

of course have to have discretion

As they

process they

dealing with the topics
and problems

statutes

they shall

delegate

to the respective

one. Very significant

act usually

of a certain

broad

agency so that the

authorizes

problem without

is the fact that an

an agency to e.g. take care

stating that the agency shall

take care that this certain problem should be solved.
This is to the contrary
execute

most

can fulfill their tasks in the way they think is

the correct
organic

is the

correct one. Though several agencies

administrate
citizens

thinks

in Germany where the agencies

the laws. Though they do have discretionary

this discretionary

power exists only concerning

402

only

power

factual

as was mentioned above there is a big difference
concerning this "authorization" between american and german
agencies: the german agency's duty is stated in the
respective statute so that a citizen may derive an
entitlement from the respective statute against the agency
to act in a certain desired way (if the legal and factual
requirements are fUlfilled)
402
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questions.

As the agencies

the political

process

broad discretionary

in Germany

do not take part in

there is not the necessity

authority.

to delegate

PART V

COMPARISON

OF THE POSSIBILITIES

A) Differences

in the Judicial

OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW

Review

1) review of which agency actions

a) agency actions
Almost

all administrative

actions are reviewable

in the

u.s.

and Germany.

In Germany GG art. 19 (4) ensures that there is

an efficient

protection

review of administrative
against adjudications,

against sovereign
actions therefore
administrative

There is no judicial review against
German Bundestag
enacted because
against
agency's

actions. Judicial
may be obtained

acts and statutes.
laws enacted by the

but if there is an administrative

act

of this law and a person takes legal action

this administrative

act the law as a basis for the

action will be controlled

incidently.

403

Excluded

but as laws are enacted by the German Bundestag and not
by administrative agencies the specific review of laws is
not a part of this thesis
403
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from jUdicial

review404 are discretionary

administrative

agencies.

As the german

actions

of the

legal system

primarily

obeys the rule of law the only thing which is

important

concerning

the availability

of judicial review

whether

a subjective

through

the agency action and not which type of action the

agency

right of the plaintiff

is

may be harmed

chose.

In the U.S. legal system there is a presumption
reviewability

of administrative

of reviewability

Court decisions

Gardner

decision.

rebutted

though

- especially

The presumption

by the Abbott Lab. v.
can be

by statute406 or

if the review is precluded

acted within

by several

of reviewability

its discretionary

the Court found that the "committed
exception

This presumption

of the APA was strengthened

Supreme

if the agency

action.4~

of

power.407 Though

to agency discretion"

is a very narrow one408 the cases where the agency

acts within

its discretionary

actions

are not reviewable

usually

delegates

power and therefore

may occur quite often as Congress

broad discretionary

authority

404at least to some extent, see following
405see supra p. 74
406AP A

§

701 (a) (1 )

407APA

§

701 (a) (2)

these

~8 see supra p.75; 401 U.S. 402,410

to the

pages A) c)
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agencies.409

Therefore

reviewability"410
the actions

though there is the "presumption

u.s.

in the

reviewable

nevertheless

This may be as more statutes

agencies

to act with discretionary

The difference
actions

therefore

of the agencies

only a presumption
possibility

of

the two legal

u.s.

in the

authorize

power than in Germany.

is that though most administrative
in the

u.s.

are reviewable

which can be rebutted

to review all administrative

constitutional

the percentage

may differ between

systems.

of

demand and is guaranteed

this is

whereas

the

actions

is a

through

GG art 19(4)

in Germany.

b) agency
concerning

inaction?
an agency's

refusal to act the Supreme Court

established

a "presumption

presumption

of unreviewability

the respective

of unreviewability".41.1 This
has its main foundation

statute which usually

authorizes

to do certain

things but which seldom requires

do explicitly

mentioned

participation

of the administrative

political

process.

things.

in

the agency
the agency to

This, too, is a sign for the
agencies

at the

If an agency would be required

to fulfill

409this is necessary as the agencies are a part of the
political process; see supra pp. 15-18; M.Strobel, supra
note 35, 1321
410except those mentioned
41.1470 U.S. 821,831

in APA

§

701 (a)
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explicitly
process

ordered things the political

would be disturbed.

unreviewability
demands

This presumption

can be rebutted

making

of

if the respective

statute

a certain action of the agency and if the court

therefore

has a "meaningful

can be controled.
person

decision

standard"

An inaction

with which the action

is reviewable

therefore

suffers a legal wrong through the inaction,

inaction

is not totally committed

if a

if the

to agency discretion

and

if the refusal to act is a final agency action.412
In Germany

there is no such "presumption

of an agency's

of unreviewability"

refusal to act. On the contrary

there are

several types of lawsuits which are used to enforce a
certain

desired but rejected

the Verpflichtungsklage

and the allgemeine

(action for performance).
control whether
requested
reviewable

administrative

agency action;
Leistungsklage

With these two lawsuits courts can

the agency had a duty to act in the

way. As all administrative

agency actions are

and as it is known that inaction may cause the

same damage as an action the legislator
constitutional

obligation

had the

to ensure that there is a chance

to review all agency actions and refusals
GG art. 19 (4).413

Most important

to act,

is that the plaintiff

4U

see supra p. 87

413

see supra p. 20; see; K.C.Davis,

supra note 219
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states

in a plausible

may be harmed through

way that his/her
the agency's

refusal

Courts

of course have to have a meaningful

review

the agency

provided

inaction.

by the enacting

agency has discretion
whether

§

to act.
standard

This standard

usually

to

is

statute of the agency unless the

to decide whether

it will act or

it will not act.

c) discretionary
VwGO

rights414

subjective

actions

114 empowers

the expediency
discretionary

german courts to review the legality

of an agency action if the agency made a
decision.

agency made a decision

A court will examine whether

an agency made a decision

certain

limits of the discretionary

do not exist, whether

the agency
routine".4u
agency's
statutory

thinking

that there are

power while these limits

the agency made an arbitrary

the agency really used its discretion
instead

of that just followed

If none of these "mistakes"

action

an

based on facts that do not exist,

whether

and whether

and

is within the statutory

decision
or whether

the "usual
occurred

and the

boundaries

and

orders the court of course has to and will defer

to the agency's

decision.

Even if one of those "mistakes"

was made and the agency therefore

414see supra p.55
4U see supra p.22

did not act within

its
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legal boundaries
successful

the lawsuit of the plaintiff

only if a subjective

right of the plaintiff

One of the differences

is that the organic

american

system do delegate

agencies

as they are not only executing
political

aims, whereas

in Germany

limited

they only execute the law.

The american

an abuse of discretion

weight

or otherwise

an irrelevant
a relevant
evidence

a big difference

if the agency failed to

factor.418 These four factors are almost
law. There therefore

in the possibility

is unreviewable

§ 701

is not

to review discretionary

except for arbitrariness

authorization.

If constitutional

supra note 200, p. 1490

action
and excess

rights are

supra note 49, p. 99

(2 )(A )

418see: M. Shapiro,

without

or if the agency had given improper

416see: W. Schmitt Glaeser,
417AP A

with

if the agency

In both legal systems the discretionary

of statutory

actions

capricious,

if the agency decided

the same as those in the german

itself

is very

not in accordance

occurs

factor,

factor,

to a relevant

actions.

agencies

it was "arbitrary,

law".417 An abuse of discretion

sufficient

discretionary

court has to review the discretionary

and has to find out whether

consider

power to the

the law but also

to the administrative

because

acts in the

broad discretionary

power delegated

considered

is

the illegal decision.416

hurt through

fulfilling

will be
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involved

courts in the U.S. may review the discretionary

action419,

too. Many plaintiffs

constitutional

in Germany claim that their

rights have been hurt through the

discretionary

action. The reviewing

court in Germany can and

will examine whether

the affected

weighed

in the correct manner. As long as there

and balanced

is a legal basis discretionary
may not declare

interests

decision

have been

courts in Germany

the law unconstitutional.

If a court finds

that there is a legal basis which authorizes
make an unconstitutional

decision

the court has to pass the

lawsuit to the Federal Constitutional
privilege

to declare

is reserved

is a right which

solely to the Federal Constitutional

the expediency

agency, VwGO

§

114.420

are more statutes
administrative

What is different,

delegating

agencies

Court.

as german courts may

of the discretionary

discretionary

which is necessary

tasks helping the President

419

Court because the

a law unconstitutional

The extent of jUdicial review differs
examine

the agency to

choice of the

too, is that there
power to U.S.
to fulfill their

to execute the laws.

see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

supra note 24, p. 129

420 because
of the separation of powers the courts of course
will defer to the agency's decision unless there occurred a
severe misjudgment in weighing and balancing the situation
and interests at stake
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2)

differences

in the admissibility?

What is the same in both legal systems

is the fact that

courts may not require more or stricter
requirements

than the legislator

Itmaximum" procedural

requirements

does. The APA establishes
which Congress

to have courts impose upon agencies
procedures" •421 Agencies
participation

procedural

was willing

in conducting

rulemaking

are free to grant more procedural

- rights if they wish to but courts may not

demand them. The VwVfG and the VwGO contain the procedural
participation
control

rights an agency has to offer. Courts have to

whether

all of those procedural

participation

-

rights have been offered and obeyed but they may not require
different

or more procedural

a) distinction

between

participation

admissibility

and success

Both legal systems make a distinction
admissibility

and the examination

between the

of the merits of a case.

The judge first has to examine whether
standing,

whether

plaintiff

exhausted

difference
systems:

421

the administrative

remedies.

There is a

from the origins of the two legal

judicial review are enacted

- being a common law country

PiercejShapirojVerkuil,

has

and whether the

being a civil law system all requirements

to obtain
whereas

the plaintiff

the action is reviewable

though deriving

rights.

necessary

in legislative

laws

- some necessities

supra note 24, p. 175

in
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the

u.s.

legal system are jUdge-made-Iaw,

of ripeness

and the primary

the origins

of the requirements

to obtain

jurisdiction

like e.g. the law
doctrine.

Though

which have to be fulfilled

jUdicial review differ in the two legal systems

they do have the same purpose and try to achieve the same
goal. These requirements

serve to avoid the abuse of the

legal system which would take place if the judges would have
to examine the legal questions
would not be the addressees
standing

of the action and had no

and would not be affected

These requirements

therefore

judicial branch against

b) standing
In the

of cases where the plaintiffs

u.s.

are necessary

"improper

and subjective
the plaintiff

by the action at all.

plaintiffs".

rights
has to have standing where the

judge examines

whether the plaintiff

administrative

action and suffered

that action.

is affected

by the

a "legal wrong" through

In the german legal system the plaintiff

be the addressee
administrative

to protect the

of (or at least: has to be affected

has to
by) the

action and he/she has to state in a plausible

way that his/her

sUbjective

rights have been harmed through

the agency action.
The Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff

has to have (i) an

injury in fact which must be (ii) "within the zone of
interests

to be protected

or regulated

by the statute or
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constitutional

guarantee

in question". 422The sUbjective

right as it is understood

in Germany

is almost the same as

the two step inquiry of the Supreme Court. In both
requirements
certain

there has to be a legal basis which gives

rights

individuals.
persons

not only to the community

The plaintiff

but also to the

then has to be among those

whom this statute wishes to protect

wants to attach
plaintiff

a right. Whereas

has a subjective

Germany423 the examination
meant to be especially

c) exhaustion

or to whom it

the examination

in the american

system

"is not

lawsuits

have to

demanding". 424

remedies

As the plaintiffs

in Germany

obtain

review within the administrative

the same is true concerning
remedies

in certain

the exhaustion

in the u.S. legal system.

422397 U.S. 150,

the

right is quite strict in

of administrative

a pretrial

whether

agency

of administrative

In Germany

a lawsuit will
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423 possibly because the question whether the plaintiff has
a subjective right is more important concerning the
protection of interests: if there is a subjective right
which may be hurt the individual is more important than the
agency decision, if there is no subjective right a lawsuit
will not be successful even if the action of the agency
should be illegal
424 479 U. S . 38 B; this may be as in most cases the agency has
discretion so that the main restriction of review will be in
the examination whether the action is reviewable or
unreviewable
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not be admissed

if a pretrial

not been obtained
will be admitted

by the plaintiff.

the court.

the pretrial
separation

In the U. s. a lawsuit

425

during the procedure

remedies

have

of

remedies will not be examined
The exhaustion

426

but has

but issues which could have been

and examined

administrative

is required

even if the administrative

not been exhausted
discussed

proceeding

of administrative

review are necessities

and accepted by
remedies

to maintain

and

the

of powers as courts should not interfere

with the

decisionmaking

process of the agencies

shall unburden

the judicial branch Of all those lawsuits

that can be solved between the affected
negotiations

d)

and additional

the competent

A necessity
system

VwGO

§

participation.

which is not required

to recourse

whether

in the american

the respective

to the administrative

40 (1). This is not necessary

judicial branbh

parties through

court

is the question

admissible

and they furthermore

is not divided

legal

lawsuit is
courts,

in the U.S. as the

and concerned

with different

legal topics. As the judicial branch

is divided427

each "branch"

it has jurisdiction

has to examine whether

425

see supra p. 56

4~

see supra p. 127

4~

see supra pp. 6 - 10

in Germany
or
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whether

a different

concerned

court is competent.

mainly with criminal

administrative

law impacts)

If a lawsuit

or labor law (with certain

an administrative

law court may

not admit this lawsuit but instead has to dismiss
american
plaintiff
german

court will send the lawsuit to another

it. An

court if the

took legal action before the wrong court while a

court simply will dismiss

attorney

is

the lawsuit.

Either the

takes the legal action before the competent

court

or there will be no legal action.

e)

final agency actions?

APA

§

704 requires

that the action brought

before a court is

a final agency action.428 A final agency action is required
to avoid interferences
the executive
powers.
Germany,

Agency

with the decisionmaking

branch and to maintain
actions

and decisions

too, to be reviewable

In contrast

process

the separation

of

of

have to be final in

by an administrative

court.

to the U.S. legal system there are exceptions

from that rule: if (i) an agency has not acted yet but has
acted in an illegal way before and will act in the same way
soon again and an irretrievable

situation

may occur through

this action and if (ii) the agency takes three months or
longer to make a decision
cases the plaintiff
court may examine

4~

or to answer a request.

may take legal actions

the lawsuits

see supra pp. 127 - 129

In these

respectively

the

before a final agency action
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has been made. Final agency action is not required

in these

cases as it is quite evident that the agency will act in a
harmful

and illegal way or that it is not fulfilling

tasks. with these two possibilities
with the agency decisionmaking

their

courts may "interfere"

process

(though they only

either prevent

an illegal action or help citizens

rights enacted

in the VwGO). concerning

to their

the requirement

of

finality

the german legal system avoids its strict and

abstract

system and instead of that puts more weight on the

individual

case.

f) time limit to take legal action?
Obtaining

judicial review in Germany the plaintiff

has to

take care that he/she takes the legal action within one
month after the administrative

agency acted, VwGO

Though this is not a requirement
it is a presupposition

necessary

§

74.

for all lawsuits

for some of the legal actions429,

especially

for those where the agency and the addressee

confronted

with legally binding

There is no rule concerning

are

actions.

a certain period of time within

which a legal action must have been taken in the U.S •. The
addressee

therefore

may wait as long as he/she

wishes but there of course

is the risk that the action will

429 for the Anfechtungsklage,
the Verpflichtungsklage
Fortsetzungsfeststellungsklage,
see supra pp. 59/60

and the
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be executed
obtain~d

and irretrievable

too late.

3) differences

a) different
Though

in the success?

judicial branches

there is a big difference

legal systems considering
branch

if the legal action will be

dealing

between the

fact that there is this difference

law in Germany

- the

is the only fact which

here.

First of all this difference
purpose

and german

the fact that there is a jUdicial

only with administrative

can be mentioned

u.s.

in the legal systems serves the

of the law of the respective

country and second the

there is no empirical

data available

advantage,

or success of the jUdicial review of

efficiency

cases dealing with administrative
serve the people
purpose whereas
things

topics.430

law. As the

the

u.s.

law shall

it may not be too complex to serve this
the german law with the amount of different

it tries to regulate

an efficient

concerning

is too complex to be judged in

way by one judge dealing with all legal

All that can be said here therefore

is that each

judicial branch serves the purpose of the legal system.
Another

important

difference

has a legal entitlement

to have his/her

the Federal Constitutional

4~

see supra pp. 7-9

is that the citizen

in Germany

lawsuit reviewed

Court if his/her constitutional

by
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guar~nteed
decision

rights possibly

could be harmed through the

of the Federal Administrative

court of last resort concerning

Court which is the

administrative

u.s. there is no such legal entitlement

law. In the

to go to the Supreme

Court but this does not mean that there is less protection
or review available

but only that the structure

system

and demands different

is different

of the court

tasks from the

"court of the last resort".

b) scope of review
Whereas

in Germany

all actions of an administrative

are jUdicial reviewable
kind of action
U.S. concerning

agency

to the same extent no matter what

is involved there is a distinction

in the

the extent of judicial review and the kind

of action under review. As mentioned

and explained431

german

the formal and

administrative

objective

legitimacy

court examines

of the administrative

same extent concerning
regardless

whether

a

actions to the

factual and legal questions

the action is an administrative

act or an

order or a rule. The extent of the jUdicial review of course
differs
examined
varying

concerning

the procedural

by a court as the different
procedural

demands.

the review of administrative
american

4ll

requirements

which can be

kind of actions have

This is not the same concerning
actions

in the u.S. In the

legal system courts make two distinctions:

see supra pp. 64 - 67
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(i) courts have a different
formal rulemaking
rUlemaking

attitude

and adjudication

examining

the extent of

on one and informal

on the other side and (ii) courts make a thorough

distinction

between the factual and the legal control of the

agency action.

432

to (i): Whereas
adjudication

the formal rulemaking

are examined

and formal

by the substantial

evidence

the APA does not require that the informal rulemaking
be examined
whether

by the substantial

it is arbitrary

the respective
rulemaking
test.434

agency sometimes

Though enacting
procedural

makes a distinction
procedural
informal

and capricious.

has to be examined

obey certain

evidence

rulemaking

has to

test but only
433

requires

The organic act of
that the informal

by the substantial

evidence

an informal rule the agency has to
requirements435

the APA nevertheless

to the formal rulemaking

requirements

test

are also required

and the informal

where

and puts the

adjudication

side.

432

see supra p. 104

433

supra p. 110; R. Dolzer, supra note 27, p.589

434

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

4~

see supra pp. 94/95

supra note 24, p. 339

on one
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As there is only a "brief explanation"
informal

adjudication

required436

there is no substantial

making an

standard

upon

which a court could review.
to (ii): What is quite significant
the two legal systems concerning
procedural
action.437

requirements

is the difference

between

the review of the

and the content of the respective

Because the main focus of the administrative

courts

in Germany

is the "subjective

right" which might be

harmed

they examine the legal and the factual issues. As in

the U.S. "due process of law" is a constitutional
courts primarily

examine whether

have been observed.

Reviewing

the procedural

an agency decision

often defer to the special knowledge
agency not only concerning
questions.438

Therefore

administrative

actions

of the observance

requirements
courts

of the respective

factual but sometimes

the american

demand

also legal

courts reviewing

put more weight on their examination

of the procedural

requirements

whereas the

german courts examine the factual issues, too.

436

supra p. 105

437
see: R. Dolzer,
note 38, p. 383

438

H. Jarass,

supra note 27, p. 580; H. Jarass,

supra note 38, p. 386

supra
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B)

Reasons

for those Differences

As has been mentioned
diff~rences
actions

concerning

deriving

cultural

and explained

the judicial review of administrative

from the historical

attitudes

The reasons

are very much reflected

actions

the respective

in the realization

acting authority.

whereas

A very thorough

and important

of the
against

From what was

administrative

agencies

on the system of

are the different

agencies.

even the assignments

aims and understanding

is put

439

review of both countries

and sometimes

legal

justice for the community

influence

and aims of the administrative

purposes,

system

in the united states more weight

upon justice for the individual.

judicial

political

so far it is quite clear that the german

system tries to ensure an abstract
of citizens

and

and legal systems.

of judicial review of individuals

of a sovereign

represented

developments

towards the political

for constructing

possibilities

there are several

purposes

Though the names

are quite similar the
of the tasks of

are quite different

in the United

states and in Germany.
Whereas

in both countries

the administrative

execute

the laws agencies

in Germany

agencies

are "politically

this does not necessarily cover all requirements
concerning the judicial review of administrative
actions/inactions
but this is true concerning the aim and
purpose of the legal system as such

439
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neutral"

and agencies

in the united states are "political

tools" of the executive
difference

concerning

branch. This is a very important

the understanding

of the judicial review of administrative
countries.

Helping the President

and the realization
actions in both

to execute the laws

agencies

have to have broad discretionary

deciding

how they will reach certain goals and fulfill

certain tasks.440 This participation
very often makes an administrative
unreviewable

authority

in

in the political
agency's

process

action

as the agencies have this very broad

discretionary

power. In Germany administrative

not have discretionary

agencies do

power to the same extent which - as a

result - leads to a narrow and strict judicial review. This
"close" or "strict"

judicial review is not only a result of

the fact that the agencies do not have very much
discretionary
experiences

power but this is also an answer to historic
to ensure that actions of an agency acting for

the sovereign

power can be supervised.

The review of agency decisions,
more extensive

and the agencies do not have very much

power.

Though there is the presumption
united

is

in Germany as all actions and inactions are

jUdicial reviewable
discretionary

actions and inactions

of reviewability

states this is only a presumption

in the

which can be

without broad discretionary power agencies would execute
the laws for Congress and not for the President

440
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rebutted

so that there is not necessarily

the possibility

review an agency action. The same is true concerning
judicial review of administrative
inactions

can be reviewed

presumption

the

inaction. While all

in Germany there is the

of unreviewability

states. Concerning

to

of inactions

the reviewability

in the United

or unreviewability

of

agency inaction the organic statute of the agencies seem to
be the reason for the different

attitudes

towards the

review. While the organic act in Germany lists and defines
the respective

agency's powers and especially

has to fulfill the organic statutes
grant broad discretionary
authorizing
ordering

the tasks it

in the United states

power to the agencies while

them to execute the laws without explicitly

to do certain tasks.

In Germany

an administrative

agency has to fulfill explicit

orders of the legislator which can be enforced by
individuals

if the respective

with gives the individuals

statute the agency is dealing

a subjective

right while the

american

agencies usually are enacted to solve a certain

national

problem or to achieve a certain goal without

explicit

standards

about how the goal should be achieved.

Reason for these different
american

administrative

attitudes

agencies are a part of the political

process whereas the german agencies
political
obtain

process.

is the fact that the

Furthermore

are not a part of the

an extensive

jUdicial review is guaranteed

possibility

in Germany to

to
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correspond

to the rule of law as the main principle

of the

legal system.
As agency decision

in the United states may contain

political

courts are very likely to defer to agency

contents

actions where the agency used discretion.
discretionary

decisions

"bound to legislative
A significant

the american courts very much are

pOlicy decisions".

441

problem for the courts in the United states

can be the difficulty
intended

Concerning

to delegate

to find out to what extent Congress
discretionary

While the use of discretionary

power to an agency.

442

power may be the exception

in

Germany the search for the "law to apply" and a "meaningful
standard"

can be main problems

Regarding

the differences

concerning
experiences

for an american court.

between the two legal systems

the timing of jUdicial review the historic
and attitudes

U.s. the strict obedience
most important443

are very clear. Whereas
of the separation

in this situation

441

Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,

40

see supra p. 81

in the

of powers is

the individual

is the

supra note 24, p. 115

443
as a response to the mingling of powers and the very
closely connected possibility of arbitrariness and injustice
as experienced with a monarchy and the various other
political systems from which the people fled
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most important

object in the legal system in Germany.444

To avoid the possible
courts

in the

whereas

u.s.

interference

branch

review only final agency decisions

german courts

(responding

demand of an efficient
administrative

with a different

to the constitutional

protection445) do interfere

agencies

to maintain

with

certain conditions

and

rights of the individuals.
The historical

development

and cultural

attitudes

towards

the jUdicial review are very clear, too, concerning
scope of review. Whereas
factual

in Germany courts may review the

and the legal issues courts in the

legal questions.
constitutional

the

u.s.

review the

As the "due process of law" is a

demand courts examine whether

has had the legally required

procedures.

the individual

The factual issues

are facts to which the courts in most cases defer to the
agencies

special knowledge.

The individual

is responsible

for his actions and for the government

the majority

chose

and the jUdicial branch

to guarantee

a fair

procedure

is responsible

but not the contents

of decisions

having political

contents.

444to avoid the possibility that unjust or illegal sovereign
actions may cause an irretrievable situation; as a response
to the 3rd Reich there has to be the possibility to obtain
jUdicial review before it might be too late; see:
P. Kirchhof, supra note 102
445guaranteed

through GG art 19 (4)
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As very many mistakes
judgements

can be made because of wrong

of factual issues courts in Germany do control

the factual issues and with that the sovereign
obedience

to the constitutional

power and its

demands.

C) Conclusion

As was to be expected there are not only differences
there are also similarities
of administrative

concerning

but

the jUdicial review

actions in the american

and the german

legal systems.

The differences
experiences
political
general

correspond

to the countries'

and the different

attitudes

historic

towards the

system whereas the similarities

correspond

aim of the jUdicial review: the protection

individual

and the democratic

to the

of the

values.

What is very obvious is that the different

attitudes

the respective

political

administrative

agencies and the review of their actions.

"Learning

by experience"

eminent differences
different

historic

system are reflected

towards

in the

seems to be what constitutes

the

between the two legal systems. The
experiences

cultivate

towards the purpose of the political

the attitudes

and legal systems.
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These systems are build to especially
to avoid certain mistakes
or experienced

establishes

the certainty

in the future that have been made

in the past.

One society establishes
the individual

manifest

a political

and legal system where

is the main focus whereas the other

a legal system to protect the democratic

system.

While in Germany the main weight is put upon the strict and
correct

appliance

the american
personal

of the law the most important object in

legal system is the individual

and his/her

freedom. The very strict use of the legal system in

Germany does not offer many possibilities
respect cases on an individual
consideration

of the individual

to judge and

basis whereas

in the u.s. the

problem is very important.

Laws in Germany are enacted to serve the system while in the
U.S. the laws are enacted to serve the individual.

Also as a historical
obedience

to the seperation

whereas the executive
connected

experience

of powers in the united states

and legislative

branches

are closely

in Germany. As a result of this and because they

are a part of the executive

administrative

United States fulfill different
agencies.

there is a very strict

in the

tasks than the german

Because of these different

tasks individuals

both countries

are in different

administrative

agencies actions. Whereas

focus of the agencies

agencies

positions

is the individual

in

as addressee's

of

in Germany the main
in the United states
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the addressee

of agency actions very often is the general

public. This leads to different

attitudes

and necessities

control the agency actions which are reflected
the different
control

requirements

and possibilities

of the administrative

Though there are differences

agencies

to

in some of

of the jUdicial

actions.

not only concerning

the

judicial

review but also the purpose of the administrative

agencies

there nevertheless

are similarities

in the way the

legal systems try to achieve the main goals of the jUdicial
review: the protection
the powers.

of the individual

and the control of

APPENDIX:

1) Explanation

of some German legal terms:

GG = german constitution

(Grundgesetz)

the name Grundgestz and its formally correct translation
"Basic Law" aims at the intent of the "fathers" of the
constitution that this constitution sould be preliminary
until the country would be reunified and when the german
nation as a whole could enact a constitution. Therefore
they hesitated to name it "German Constitution" to
respect the feelings of the people who were not able to
enact a democratic constitution. Though "Basic Law" may
be the formal correct translation it does not reflect the
intent of the word "Grundgesetz". This name means that
this law will be the fundamental law, the foundation of a
new constitutional beginning.
After the reunification

of Germany on October,

3rd 1990,

there was a commission of members of Parliament and
Senate evaluating wether new articles or changes on the
Grundgesetz would be necesary. This commission was
required by Art. 5 of the reunification - treaty of the
18.05.1990
commission

between East- and West - Germany signed. This
- ending its work on July 1st, 1992 - came to

the conclusion that no new constitution or great changes
would have to be made (see the discussion of the result
of the commission: J.Isensee "Mit blauem Auge
davongekommen
Wochenschrift

- das Grundgesetz"
1993,2583)
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in: Neue Juristische
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=

VwGO

rules of the administrative

proceedings

courts / legal

(Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung)

VwVfG = general rules of the different possibilities
which the administrative agency can act

=

BVerfG

Federal Constitutional

in

Court [F.C.C.]

(Bundesverfassungsgericht)
- the only court in
Germany whose decisions can be law, sec. 31 II
BVerfGG; this Court consists of two chambers, in each
chamber there are eight Justices; the Justices do not
have life tenure but are appointed
can not be appointed again
BVerfGE
BVerfGG

collection

=

of the decisions

for 12 years and

of the BVerfG

act that sets up the procedural

rules,

requirements and structure for the Fed.Con.Court
(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz)
BVerwG = Federal Administrative

Court

(Bundesverwaltungsgericht);
this is the only federal
administrative court and the highest court deciding on
administrative law
BVerwGE
VGH

=

collection

of the decisions

of the BVerwG

=

higher administrative court, (Verwaltungsgerichtshof);
in some states the higher administrative court is called
Oberlandesgericht
(OLG)

Verwaltungsgericht
= administrative
court (VG); the
"lowest" court dealing with administrative law
ZPO = code of civil procedures

(Zivilprozessordnung)
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admissibility

= wether a lawsuit is successful depends on

two questions: the first part is a formal
examiniation where the judges examine wether a
legal right of the plaintiff could be hurt,
whether standing, timing and exhaustion are
fulfilled, in short, whether the plaintiff has
the right to sue; in the second step the merits
of the case are examined; the first step is
called admissibility .(Zulaessigkeit)
success

=

legally justified claim; a lawsuit is successful

if the examination of the merits of the case proove that
either the agency hurt a legally guaranteed right of the
plaintiff or if the plaintiff has a legal right to demand a
certain action of the administrative agency
provisional

judicial review

=

especially

because of the

rule of law - GG art 20 (3) - and the principle of the
efficiency of the protection by law - GG art 19 (4) - the
german parliament enacted rules ,- sec. VwGO 80,80a,123,
47 (8) - which make it possible for plaintiffs to achieve a
quick provisional/interlocutory
judgement if it is
necessary to prevent a severe damage when the "usual"
judicial relief would take too long to guarantee an
efficient protection of the endangered guaranteed right.
preventive jUdicial review = this remedy is not explicitly
written down in the VwGO but is a requirement of
GG art 19 (4) and the principle of the efficient
protection by law and tries to protect a special legal
interest [BVerfGE 40, 323,326] which is endangered if
an agency would enact a certain impending

act or rule

Vorverfahren = (pretrial review) most remedies (except
those that explicitly require an instant jUdicial

176

relief or where the statute does not require a
pretrial review) require that the citizen who wants
to take legal action files a complaint at the
administrative agency against which the citizen plans
to take legal action, VwGO § 68 (1).
Different than in the US administrative agencies
there is no Administrative Law Judge but the
"ordinary"
complaint.

civil servants try to solve or reject the

During this pretrial review of the administrative
agency the act, order or rule may not be implemented
or enforced, VwGO sec. 80,80a.
Allgemeines Rechtsschutzbeduerfnis
= legitimate interest to
take legal action; necessary as a prohibition of the misuse
of procedural rights (derived from the principle of good
faith ("Treu und Glauben" sec 242 BGB[=Civil Code])
As everybody
nevertheless

has the legal right to go to court people
have to show that they are affected by

the act or that they have legal interests which can be
damaged if they are not taking legal actions
subjektive Rechtsverletzung = infringement of a right; VwGO
sec 42 (2) demands that there has to be the plausible
possibility of an injury of a subjective legal right / norm
which is guaranteed to the individual. Because the subj.
Rechtsverletzung
is examined in the first part
(admissibility) of the judges examination he has to look
wether there is the likely chance and plausible possibility
that the individual is hurt through the act/order of the
agency. The question wether he really is hurt is a question
of the second part (success of the lawsuit)
Klageart suis generis = developed out of the guarantee
legal protection of GG art 19 (4) and VwGO sec. 40

of
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therefore

there is the possibility

to take legal action

before an administrative court if the sUbject/act/rule is
one of public law (without beeing constitutional law) and
if the other requirements
lawsuit is not explicitly

are fulfilled
guaranteed

even if a certain

formal/objective legitimacy (of the order/act) = there are
certain forms and procedures that have to be respected by
the agency before it acts in a certain way which are
required by law tro ensure equal treatment and reliance in
the procedure in which the agency decides to act and in the
sovereign in general.If there have been mistakes in this
formal part the order/act is void. If these formal
procedures have been used in the correct way by the agency
the second question is wether the legal rights of the
addressee of the act/orde have been hurt without a
justification.
suhjektives oeffentliches Recht = subjective public right;
there is a classification of legal rights in Germany:
(a) the subjective public right is a public legal right
given to the individual written down in statutes; with this
subjective public right he/she can demand a special
action/inaction from the government
for it. It has to be made plausible

or the agencies acting
that a subjective

public right may be harmed through the administrative
agency action, VwGO § 42 (2), as one of the requirements

to

be admitted to court. Not everybody has the same subj.
public rights because these rights protect different things
like e.g. property, a certain living area, entitlement
special building permission etc.

to a

(b) an objective legal right is not something an individual
can demand a certain action or protection from. Objective
legal rights just describe or regulate certain things which
are necessary to obtain in a society but which give no
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legal title to anybody to demand a certain action from an
agency or the government
administrative
administrative

act = a special legal term in Germany; the
act is the type of action the agencies

choose to use in most cases; an administrative act (defined
in VwVfG § 35) is directed at an individual or a small
group of people (which still can be individualized) and
either orders the individual/group to do something or
benefits
binding.

the adresse. An administrative

act is legally

2) Selected Articles
Art 19 (Restriction

from the Grundgesetz:
of basic rights):

(1) In so far as a basic right may, under this Basic Law,
be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law must apply
generally and not solely to an individual case.
Furthermore, such law must name the basic right,
indicating the Article concerned.
(2) In no case may the essential
be encroached upon.

content of a basic right

(3) The basic rights shall apply also to domestic juristic
persons to the extent that the nature of such rights
permits.
(4) Should any person's right be violated

by public

authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him. If
jurisdiction is not specified, recourse shall be to the
ordinary courts."
Art 20 (Basic principles
resist):

of the constitution

- Right to

(1) The Federal Republic
social federal state.

of Germany is a democratic

and

(2) All state authority emanates from the people. It shall
be exercised by the people by means of elections and
voting and by specific legislative, executive, and
judicial organs.
(3) Legislation

shall be subject to the constitutional

order; the executive
law and justice.

and the judiciary shall be bound by
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(4)

All Germans shall have the right to resist any person

or persons seeking to abolish that constitutional
should no other remedy be possible.
Art 79

(3)

order,

= Amendments of this Basic Law affecting the

division of the Federation into states, the participation
on principle of states in legislation, or the basic
principles laid down in Articles
inadmissible.

1 and 20, shall be

Art 1 (Protection of human dignity)
(1) the dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.
The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basic of every community,
of peace and justice in the world.
(2)

The following basic rights shall bind the legislature,
the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable
law.
(3)

-

---------

-~

---
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